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Editorial

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Philip L. Mossman, M.D.
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Cover: An arrangement of 28 coins recovered from the St. John River Valley area featuring a Spanish-American eight reales surrounded by Spanish pistareens, a quarter-pistareen, several two-bit pieces of two reales, a few one real coins and many half-reales or picayunes. Coins such as these were the most prominent silver currency in British North America including the Royalist settlements. *Courtesy of Tim Allen.*



We are pleased to present an important paper which serves as an addendum to Dr. Philip Mossman's 1993 *magnum opus* titled *Money of the American Colonies and Confederation*. Phil needs no introduction to *CNL* readers. He is one of the foremost authorities in the field of colonial numismatics. Phil took over as *CNL* editor when Jim Spilman retired, a position Phil held until two years ago. Currently he is serving *CNL* as contributing editor.

Study of the monetary history of mainland British North America would be misleading if only those colonies which form the nucleus of present-day United States were studied. Therefore, in this issue, Phil writes about the "Money of the 14th Colony" or that of Nova Scotia. After publication of his book, he states that he became acutely aware that within his book he hadn't done justice to the monetary history of the 14th Colony. Thus, the reason he undertook this current work. But, there is another reason and it is a personal one. Phil's original Mossman ancestors immigrated to Nova Scotia in the eighteenth century, another subject of great interest to him.

Nova Scotia, which was carved out of former French Acadia, is all but forgotten even though it formed an integral part of the Massachusetts Bay Colony from 1691 to 1749. This study traces the monetary history of Nova Scotia which was closely linked to the New England economy for over a half-century. It reviews the documentary evidence summarized by Adam Shortt in his 1933 work on the currency, exchange and finance in Nova Scotia and relates this material to other resources and the economies of the lower 13 colonies. The paper describes the Massachusetts paper money and

the various coins which were current in Nova Scotia during the period. The coins recovered from archeological sites and old French and Loyalist settlements are described and illustrated. The role of Nova Scotia in the American Revolution and the subsequent Loyalist migration are discussed.

Studies, such as Phil's, are the backbone of early American numismatics. But, don't think you have to research and write a comprehensive study to be published in *CNL*. We are interested in reporting new discoveries in addition to all kinds of informational tidbits that you may come across. Our editors are very knowledgeable in the field of early American numismatics and very willing to help you prepare your material for publication. So, if you come across something of interest, please contact me at the below e-mail address or mail the information to Juliette at the ANS (her contact information is on the inside of the front cover) and she will see that I receive your material.

Many of you have expressed a desire to see the *CNL* back issues that were published by the Colonial Newsletter Foundation (issues 1 through 103) converted into softcopy. Hard copies of these issues are not now readily available. I'm pleased to report that an effort is currently underway to do just that. I am working with our Editor Emeritus, James C. Spilman, to convert these issues into PDF (Portable Document Format) which is the industry standard for preserving hard copy documents in an electronic format. Acrobat Reader, free software from Adobe Corporation, is required to open and print this format.

Jim and I are working from the original camera-ready pages which he had preserved. By doing this we obtain the best possible conversion clarity of both text and photographs. The softcopy issue files will not be searchable, thus, in addition to these files a searchable cumulative index will be generated, also in PDF format. The project is currently about 25% completed. Stay tuned to future editorials for information on how to obtain softcopy *CNL* back issues on a CD-ROM. The publication of this CD is a project funded by the Colonial Newsletter Foundation.

Our publisher, The American Numismatic Society, has begun its move to their new downtown Manhattan headquarters at 96 Fulton Street. As you might guess, this move will require a tremendous amount of work and many months to accomplish. For now, their contact information will remain as reported on the inside of our front cover. When the move is completed we will update the contact information to reflect the new location.

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Money of the 14th Colony: Nova Scotia (1711-1783)

by

Philip L. Mossman, M.D.: Bangor, ME

Introduction

Most history texts tend to concentrate on those events within our colonial period which were directly linked to the eventual 48 contiguous continental states. Since our attention is directed only toward those “original thirteen English colonies” we tend to lose sight of British North America as the parent entity. Such a myopic focus results in the tendency to teach the colonial history of North America in terms of the subsequent political division of the Federal United States where pre-revolutionary events are interpreted in the light of subsequent post-revolutionary effects. Thus we do not consider all of British North America’s 17 colonies as an entity, but rather we have been conditioned by our traditional American education to concentrate only on those thirteen colonies that eventually grew into the United States of America.¹ This current paper will explore the currency of Nova Scotia as it correlates with the history and economic development of the colony, and, in particular, its relationship with the lower thirteen colonies and New France. This aspect was not stressed in my 1993 publication, *Money of the American Colonies and Confederation*, and it is hoped that this present article will complement that prior work.

From a numismatic viewpoint – and certainly when considering the economic history of the continent – it is more logical to consider United States history prior to the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which ended the American Revolution, as an integral part of the history of British North America. It is only after the U. S. Constitution of 1787 that our country was launched into the American Federal period with the subsequent development of the nation as it stands today. In regard to numismatic history, it has been convenient to use the establishment of the Federal Mint from 1792-93 as the endpoint of the “colonial” period since the Confederation coinages are so integrally connected with the earlier currencies.

History and Money of the 14th Colony

Pre-1783 British North America – exclusive of the West Indies – consisted of as many as 17 mainland colonies.² Among this number is the 14th Colony, Nova Scotia,³ which is all but ignored in United States history despite its importance to the heritage of British North America where, for a significant period, it was a dependency of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.

1. The French Regime

The history of Acadia⁴ – the land from which Nova Scotia would eventually be carved – is intimately entwined with the fate and fortunes of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, her formidable near-

1 See John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British North America 1607-1789* (Chapel Hill, 1985, 1st ed.) pp. 111-16, who emphasize the importance of Britain's Atlantic empire as an entity.

2 Newfoundland (1583), Nova Scotia (1711), Québec (1763), and Prince Edward Island (1767) make up the total of the 17 British North American colonies in addition to Rupert's Land which was managed by the Hudson's Bay Company (1670). The usual numbered sequence assigned to the colonies is inconsistent with their order of creation. Strictly speaking, Québec was not a political entity until 1763 although the city dates from 1608.

3 The 14th British Colony is not to be confused with Vermont, admitted as the 14th state of the Union in 1791.

4 Except where noted, the primary historical resource used here is Peter L. McCreath and John G. Lee, *A History of Early Nova Scotia* (Halifax, 1990) 3rd ed. One source states the name Acadia is from the Mi'kmaq *Acadie* or *Aquoddy* – meaning “place” or “region” – such as is found in the word *Passamaquoddy* (John Fiske, *New France and New England* [Boston, 1902], p. 50).

See Appendix I on page 2587 for a map of the geographical locations discussed within the text.

neighbor and frequent adversary to the south. Acadia was the most northeasterly part of New France along the Atlantic seacoast which had been formerly claimed in the name of King Francis I by the explorer Jacques Cartier in 1534, although the region had been previously explored and mapped on behalf of France by Giovanni da Verrazano ten years earlier. Its territory extended to include *Île Royale* (Cape Breton Island), *Île St. Jean* (Prince Edward Island), present-day Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, Maine north of the Kennebec River, and the Gaspé Peninsula on the southern shore of the St. Lawrence which is now in the Province of Québec.

Interest in colonizing New France began in earnest in 1598 when the politically shrewd Protestant Henry IV, after having settled the internal religious wars which had plagued his country for years, turned his attention to America and rejoined in the race for territory in the New World along with England, Portugal and Spain. France concentrated its colonization efforts to the north, perhaps with an eye on the lucrative cod fisheries and fur trade while relinquishing the more temperate southern regions to the Spanish⁵ and English. King Henry still had hope of finding a western route to China through the St. Lawrence River system. After a few unsuccessful sorties, the geographer, Samuel de Champlain, explored the St. Lawrence River in 1603 as far as present-day Montreal. In 1604, Champlain, in the company of Pierre du Guast, the Sieur de Monts, a Huguenot merchant, explored the southern tip of Nova Scotia where, the following year, they founded the colony of Port Royal on the eastern shore of the Bay of Fundy. Interestingly, in 1605, these two adventurers explored as far south as Cape Cod but rejected both Plymouth and Boston as potential sites and returned north to Port Royal with its excellent harbor. How a different decision could have changed our history!

In 1608, Sieur de Monts founded Québec City on the St. Lawrence River in that area of New France, northwest of Acadia, called *Canada*.⁶ Acadia, while politically related to Canada, was governed locally under the aegis of Versailles, and in most matters remained independent of Québec.⁷ In 1612, a Jesuit colony was established on *Île des Monts Déserts*, the present-day location of Acadia National Park in Bar Harbor, Maine. The following year, an English force from Virginia, who resisted this intrusion into what they considered their territory, burned the settlements at Mt. Desert and Port Royal. From that time on, Acadia, began a ping-pong ball career in a game of international table tennis between France and England who were at loggerheads over control of the region which changed hands seven times from 1621 to 1710.⁸ "Probably the possession of no part of America was the subject of so much debate as that of Acadie or Nova Scotia."⁹ Both the English and the French asserted their claim to the region based on their perceived rights of prior discovery; the English based their case on the early voyage of John Cabot in 1497, while the French cited the 1524 exploits of Verrazano.

2. Acadia changes hands

England was not going to sit idly by while France expanded its influence in North America. In 1621, Sir William Alexander, a confidant and countryman of James VI of Scotland (James I of England), was granted a proprietary charter to all the land between the St. Croix and St. Lawrence Rivers

5 The Spanish drove the French out of Florida in the 1550s.

6 Canada of that period was that territory along the shores of the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes Basin. It was ceded to Great Britain by France by the Treaty of Paris in 1763.

7 Adam Shortt, *Currency, Exchange and Finance in Nova Scotia, 1675-1758* (Ottawa, 1933), p. xv.

8 An interesting historical perspective is given in the *The Gentleman's Magazine* (1755), vol. 25, pp. 261-64. These territorial exchanges excluded the brief time from mid-1670s when Acadia and Penobscot (Castine, Maine) were under the Dutch flag.

9 John Bartlett Brebner, *New England's Outpost; Acadia before the Conquest of Canada* (New York, 1927), p. 21.

in an attempt to trump the rival French claim. Alexander, a loyal Scot, named the land New Scotland or, in Latin, *Nova Scotia*, to distinguish the area from neighboring New England to the south, and New France to the west. The English attempt to colonize their newly claimed territory in Nova Scotia was unsuccessful and the French settlements continued to flourish under the support from Québec. Alexander's forces took control of Port Royal in 1627 and Québec in 1629 but his conquests were short-lived since, under the terms of the peace treaty of *Saint Germain-en-Laye*, he was obliged to surrender his claim to the French in 1632. Although the initial English influence in Nova Scotia extended only from 1627 to 1631, Massachusetts continued to irritate the French by claiming all the land up to the St. Croix despite the treaty boundary set at the Penobscot River.


Acadia – whose French population was concentrated at Port Royal and north into the Annapolis Valley – once again fell to the British when it was captured by New Englanders in 1654 without a shot being fired. Interestingly, Sir Thomas Temple – who figured in the story of Massachusetts Pine Tree silver coinages¹⁰ – formed a partnership with two other merchants who were the heirs to the prior claim of William Alexander. This trio was granted all mainland Acadia by Oliver Cromwell who proclaimed Temple governor in 1656. Temple was such a shrewd political opportunist that he even obtained a concurrent commission as governor from the exiled King Charles II who was living in France!¹¹ In 1667, much to the dismay of Temple and his associates, Acadia was once again returned to the French while further south, New Netherland passed from the Dutch to the English in exchange for Surinam by the terms of the Treaty of Breda which concluded the second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67). This was a classic example of how victories won on the battlefield were later surrendered at the conference table. Despite the terms of the treaty, Temple employed numerous stalling tactics and procrastinated in handing over Acadia to the French for another three years. It was quite apparent to the New Englanders that it was a grave tactical error to have relinquished Acadia to the French, but obviously their opinion had no impact on the course of royal policy.

In 1672, the traditional rivals, England and France, entered into an alliance and declared war on the Dutch in the Third Anglo-Dutch War. Thanks in part to the collaboration of cooperating New England merchants, the Dutch recaptured New York and, for a brief time, occupied Acadia which they christened New Holland. The New Englanders – the theoretical allies of France – held the French Acadian governor hostage, and even succeeded in collecting his ransom from Québec! This realignment of territory was only temporary since a return to the *status quo ante bellum* was declared the following year under the Treaty of Westminster.

In the meanwhile, a lot of changes had been occurring. In Massachusetts, the first charter had been rescinded and the colonists had successfully ousted the despotic English governor, Sir Edmund Andros. In England, the Protectorate under Cromwell had ended and the people welcomed back the restored monarchy in 1660. Now in 1689, after the Glorious Revolution removed Roman Catholic James II, William of Orange shared the English throne with Queen Mary. War again broke out in Europe between England and France (League of Augsburg 1689-97) and using this continental conflict as a provocation, the persistent tension between Massachusetts and Acadia erupted into frank hostilities during the first of four French and Indian wars (King William's War). Always with an eye on Acadia and now encouraged by Thomas Temple's nephew and heir, Boston merchants again pressed their claim for the lucrative Acadian fur and fisheries trade. George Rawlyk points out that the decision to attack Acadia was partly in retaliation against the

10 Louis Jordan, *John Hull, The Mint and the Economics of Massachusetts Coinage* (C4, 2002), pp. 34, 90, 231-32, 265.

11 Withrop Bell, *The "Foreign Protestants" and the Settlement of Nova Scotia* (Sackville, NB, reprint 1990), p. 63n.



French for their recent seizure of six or seven Salem fishing vessels. Massachusetts political and mercantile interests were acutely aware that any aggression against the French would meet with the great approval of William III who would take pleasure at any injury directed against his archenemy Louis XIV. "This demonstration 'of excessive loyalty,' they hoped, would persuade William to restore their old Massachusetts Charter."¹²

In the expectation of significant plunder, Massachusetts merchants coordinated a combined New England offensive under Sir William Phips forcing the capitulation of the poorly defended garrison at Port Royal in May 1690 but failed to take Québec City. When all the accounts were tallied up, this expedition against the French "cost the single Province of Massachusetts about £50,000,"¹³ an obligation the Massachusetts treasury could only meet by issuing £42,000 in bills of credit over the next few years backed by the good faith of the colony in the expectation of redemption funded by taxes.¹⁴ These bills were receivable by the treasury at a 5% premium. Numismatists are well aware that this was the genesis of the first public paper currency issued in British North America.¹⁵ This current victory was again short-lived since Acadia was returned to the French in accord with the 1697 Peace of Ryswick (Rijswijk).

¹² George A. Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts – A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations 1630-1784* (Montreal, 1973), p. 61.

¹³ Joseph B. Felt, *Historical Account of Massachusetts Currency* (Boston 1839, repr. 1968), p. 49. These numbers are quoted from a speech made by Governor William Shirley in 1746.

¹⁴ "These early emissions established the use of the term 'Bill of Credit' as distinguished from the term 'money.' The justification for a Bill of Credit as paper money was, in effect, a borrowing for a specific public expenditure rather than an issuance of a circulating medium." See Eric P. Newman, *The Early Paper Money of America* (Iola, WI, 1997) 4th ed., quote pp. 10-11, 180-81; Philip L. Mossman, *Money of the American Colonies and Confederation* (New York, 1993), pp. 97-98.

¹⁵ This 1690 emission was the "first authorized public paper currency issued in the Western World (Europe and America.)." This is in contrast to Québec card money, a necessity money, printed on playing cards which was a temporary expedient in 1685, 1689 to 1714, and again in 1729. Nonetheless, both the Massachusetts and Québec emissions were circulating paper currency. See John J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775: A Handbook* (Chapel Hill, 1978, 1st ed.), pp. 119, 281, 284 and Robert Chalmers, *A History of Currency in the British Colonies* (1893, repr. 1972), pp. 176-77.

Included within the second Massachusetts charter in October 1691, was the provision that the Plymouth Colony, the Province of Maine, and “the Territorie called Accadia or Nova Scotia,” despite the fact it was under French control, were to be incorporated into the “Province of Massachusetts Bay in New England.” This same provision was reconfirmed by royal decree in 1725,¹⁶ and although Nova Scotia had a series of royal governors appointed from 1710 onward, it remained a *de facto* dependency of Massachusetts until the settlement of Halifax in 1749.

3. Acadia becomes Nova Scotia; the French at Louisbourg

Peace treaties notwithstanding, the Acadian-New England frontier was the scene of continued Indian attacks, sorties by French privateers against coastal communities, and other incidents of mutual harassment and treachery. King William’s War had only been settled a brief time before another European conflict, the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13), pitted the archrivals in another mortal combat; this time England and the Netherlands banded together to prevent France from inheriting the Spanish throne. These hostilities again extended into the New World as Queen Anne’s War, the second of the four French and Indian Wars, when Indian intrusions into New England settlements were encouraged by the French and both sides plundered each others’ coastal shipping. Yankee forces were again encouraged to make an attempt on Acadia which they recognized was vital to their economy. After two attacks against Port Royal were repelled by the French in 1707, another grand scale attack was planned on which Massachusetts spent some £31,000 in preparation. A British expeditionary force, promised to arrive in July 1709 to supplement the New England regiments, never appeared; it was not until October that the colonists were informed that the anticipated regulars had been reassigned to another theater of war and thus left the Bostonians holding the bag, so to speak, at a significant public expense! This episode of failed military strategic planning on the part of the English obliged the Massachusetts treasury to issue more bills of credit to finance the debt already incurred in mustering the colonial troops who had been sitting idly in Boston for several months.¹⁷ Of this event, Joseph Felt later recorded for July 24, 1711:

Another evil, consequent on the second crusade, as it was here [Boston] construed – against Canada – was, that it brought the rest of New England and other Colonies under a sort of necessity of emitting bills of credit to pay their quotas of military forces. This was an inlet of much unsafe currency into our jurisdiction, which tended to diminish the value of what Massachusetts issued. With regard to the emissions of this Province ... after their first year they stood well till 1712.¹⁸

This emission was unsecured because the Massachusetts government anticipated a reimbursement by the Royal Exchequer which was not forthcoming.¹⁹ This paper money depreciated in value after 1711 and, as a result, hard money just about disappeared from circulation. This

16 Explanatory Charter of Massachusetts Bay, 26 August 1725; “The Territory of the Colony of Massachusetts; The Province of the Massachusetts Bay in New England included the territories now known as Maine, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia.”

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/mass07.htm> and

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/mass08.htm>. (last accessed July 23, 2003)


In 1774, Parliament, as part of the *Intolerable Acts*, annulled significant sections of the colonial charter of 1691 in The *Massachusetts Government Act* dealing with elections and jury trials.

http://ahp.gatech.edu/mass_gov_act_1774.html (last accessed July 23, 2003)

17 The 1711 issue was a reissue of the May 31, 1710 emission but oddly enough, it was not authorized until 1711 despite the fact that the war was well underway (Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 185).

18 Felt, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63. Felt cites the first paragraph as an excerpt from “Discourse on American Colonial Currencies,” but does not identify the author who, I suspect, was William Douglas.

19 Joseph A. Ernst, *Money and Politics in America, 1755-1775: A Study of the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1973), pp. 26-27.



situation necessitated further emissions of these bills until 1740 to supply a sufficient medium of exchange for commerce.

On a third attempt the following year, the New Englanders finally wrested control of the French fort at Port Royal whose defenders had been weakened by disease and desertions. This was the seventh and final time for this settlement to change hands and, in honor of Britain's new queen, was renamed Annapolis Royal – or the Royal City of Anne. From this point in history, the land of Acadia became permanently known by its previous 1621 name, Nova Scotia. In August 1711, another assault against Québec failed and so that portion of New France was again saved from British domination. It was during this unsuccessful campaign when the HMS *Feversham*, which sailed from New York, was lost off Nova Scotia on October 7, 1711. A great number of coins have been salvaged from this British frigate, and since the money was consigned in New York, the recovered inventory is considered representative of the coins available in New York during that time frame.²⁰

Under the terms of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, which ended Queen Anne's War, the French were permitted to retain *Île Royale* (Cape Breton Island), where, in 1720, they began to construct a strategic fortress at Louisbourg.²¹ *Île St. Jean* (later Prince Edward Island), and Canada, that is the land along the St. Lawrence River including the cities of Québec, Trois Rivières, and Montreal,

remained French. There were by now some 7,000 Francophone Acadians living in areas controlled by the British who offered them the option of either quitting the region or remaining if they would swear allegiance to the British monarch. Most were content to remain on their farms along the fertile western shore of Nova Scotia where they wished to remain "politically neutral"²² but without declaring the required allegiance. The Acadians requested a third alternative which was denied; they promised to remain neutral in any subsequent conflict between England and France

20 See Q. David Bowers, *American Coin Treasures and Hoards* (Wolfeboro, NH, 1997), "The Wreck of the HMS *Feversham*," pp. 155-57; Robert Martin and Angel Pietri, "The Story of the HMS *Feversham*, and Massachusetts Cut Silver Use in the Colonies," *The C4 Newsletter* (Fall 2001), vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 11-31.

21 *Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History* #2 (Ottawa, 1971), p. 9.

22 Brebner, *New England's Outpost*, pp. 81, 86, 97.

but this was impractical since they were loyal Roman Catholics under the tight control of the church in Québec. They continued to supply their French compatriots in Louisbourg with necessary raw materials and foodstuffs in an active trading relationship since the climate and physical environment at Louisbourg could not support a self-sustaining agricultural community.²³ The Acadians were treated quite liberally by the English who did not require them to either pay taxes or serve in the military. Also they were paid for any work or supplies they furnished to the garrison. By contrast, the French did not show the same liberality to those Acadians who lived within their domain.²⁴ The Indians maintained their alliance with the French who treated these native peoples with sensitivity as independent equals.²⁵ The English, in distinction to the French, regarded the Native Americans as people without military or economic value and treated them disdainfully, thus frequently earning their enmity.

4. Comments on the money supply

We are most fortunate to have a compilation of 495 contemporaneous documents dealing with the economy of early Nova Scotia many of which have been preserved in the Canadian Archives.²⁶ Drawing from this work, we can follow the financial development of the colony with many facts and inferences as to the composition of its circulating currency. As with other documents of the period relating to fiscal issues, some explanatory introduction is warranted to define frequently recurring terms and concepts relating to money and the money supply.

There were many reports from the colonial period that speak of a local shortage of hard money describing how gold and silver coin was siphoned across the Atlantic to England to pay for imported manufactured necessities, consistent with the general tenants of mercantilism. This one-way traffic of specie is reputed to have created a substantial trade imbalance between British North America and its transatlantic trading partners. The magnitude of this trade deficit and resultant "money shortage" has been critically examined by modern-day economists and historians whose conclusions I summarized previously in my 1993 publication.²⁷ To briefly restate the problem, this annual trade deficit has been traditionally overstated and was not nearly as severe as originally thought since the computations proffered by earlier writers were primarily derived from the analysis of accounts of "visible" revenue. When many previously overlooked "invisible" sources of colonial income were added into the total, the once formidable trade imbalance was significantly mitigated. McCusker and Menard have stressed how the documented cyclic expansions and contractions of the colonial economies can in and of themselves account for the observed variations in hard money accessibility and of available currency and credit in general.²⁸ Coined money was present in the colonies but during times of economic slowdown, it became an issue whether one was willing to pay the inflated price for specie since those who held coined money would only sell it at a premium. As a case in point, we have already read where Massachusetts was obliged to issue bills of credit in 1690 to pay for the expenses of the Acadian offensive. In writing of this event, Judge Samuel Sewell commented, "I was at [the] making of the first Bills of Credit in year 1690: They were not made for want of Money [coins]; but for want of

23 Peter N. Moogk, *La Nouvelle France* (East Lansing, MI, 2000), p. 4.

24 Brebner, *New England's Outpost*, pp. 154, 155, 178.

25 The relationship between the French and the native peoples is covered extensively by Moogk in *La Nouvelle France*.

26 Shortt, *op. cit.*, *passim*. Included within Shortt's work are pertinent excerpts from Beamish Murdoch's three volume, *A History of Nova Scotia, or Acadie* (Halifax, 1865-67).

27 Mossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-37.

28 McCusker and Menard, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-70.

Money in the Treasury.”²⁹ This points out clearly that while there was hard money present in the Massachusetts Bay Colony at the time of this fiscal crisis, there wasn’t sufficient money in the government’s coffers and it was this deficiency which forced it to create alternative means – i.e. paper bills of credit – to meet the current expenditures of a war.

Another important factor is that early commentaries seemed primarily concerned about the presence or absence of actively circulating coined money. They paid less attention to the pool of “available ‘generic’ money” which was far greater than the immediately accessible hard coin which was the focus of their attention. If one expands the concept of money to include any medium “which routinely serves as a means of payment in organized markets,”³⁰ it is evident that the overall money supply was far greater than the current census of Spanish (including Spanish-American) pieces-of-eight available in a local community. Within this expanded definition of money, one must also include paper currency, credit, barter, “work changing” and commodities.

Among the 495 documents cited above, a quick perusal of their general content indicates that at least 19 of them make some reference to the shortage, or even absence of circulating, hard money in Annapolis Royal or Massachusetts, during certain periods. Yet within ten of these commentaries, there is continued discussion about the presence of Massachusetts paper currency and bills of exchange within the colony for the conduct of business. So the issue was not the scarcity of available generic money, the lament centered on the absence of the type of money they preferred – namely coin. This situation is well exemplified in a 1711 statement by Governor Dudley of Massachusetts who noted that despite a shortage of specie, paper currency successfully filled commercial needs.

... and truly we are so far reduced by returns for Great Britayn, that we have no money left but the bills of credit of these Provinces, which are so well established that they are a medium of trade exchange, and purchase everything as well as pieces of eight, or any other foreign coyn in use amongst us.³¹

Twenty other documents in the Shortt compendium made specific reference to the fact that commerce was hampered because of the sluggishness with which the English government honored its bills of exchange. This tardiness in reimbursement significantly increased the cost of doing business in the colony. Some writers stated that they could no longer obtain credit from their suppliers in New England who refused to accept these sterling bills of exchange drawn on London. In these cases, it was not a shortage of money that was the culprit, but a lack of immediately available credit that was the root cause of commercial stagnation – a factor directly related to the lethargic pace of redemption in Britain.

So the key fact is that even though hard money – the preferred medium for local trade – did not commonly circulate, New England bills of credit³² and bills of exchange (with some reservations as stated) filled the void. There were also instances when commodities – such as dried codfish, peas, wheat, corn, furs, sugar, molasses, tobacco, and rum³³ – were substituted in the settling of local accounts. Although the Acadians paid no taxes to the British administration, they did pay quit-rents on their lands; in 1734 it was recorded that in the Annapolis *banlieu*, the quit-rents paid amounted to £11 7s 3½d, sterling, with the payment received in “4 partridges, 135 chickens, 122

29 “Diary of Samuel Sewell,” *Collections Massachusetts Historical Society*, vol. 6 (1879), p. 366.

30 Dale K. Osborne, “Approaches to the Definition of Money,” part 2, *The Numismatist* (Sept 1984), p.1845.

31 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #42

32 Such New England bills of credit would doubtless include emissions from Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire (personal communication, John J. McCusker, April 23, 2003).

33 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #144, #165, #183, #190.

1/8 bushels of wheat, and 19s. 2d. in cash," calculated on the basis of "50d. a bushel of wheat, 18d. a hen, 5d. a pullet or a partridge."³⁴ In other instances, such quit-rents were paid in French *livres*.³⁵

On those few occasions in the absence of all other forms of money, the paymaster at the Annapolis Royal garrison issued redeemable notes to the troops that were retired as soon as the payroll arrived from Boston. Despite the complaint of no hard money for immediate use, an observation we have to accept as fact was that the economy grew even though during certain periods the progress was slow.

To mention briefly the coined money within the colonial economies, the English monarchy attempted to provide some semblance of standardization for this potpourri of foreign coins circulating in an unregulated fashion in British North America. To correct this perceived deficiency, they drafted the unenforceable Proclamation of 1704 which set the sterling rate at which a variety of common foreign silver coins was to be received based on their silver content as determined from assays performed at the Royal Mint conducted by Sir Isaac Newton.³⁶ This edict advanced the exchange rates in the colonies by one-third (100.00 sterling:133.33 colonial) and thus established the so-called "Lawful money" or "Proclamation money," abbreviated as "Proc."³⁷

5. Money in early Nova Scotia

In the late 1600s under the French regime, the only settled parts of the Nova Scotia peninsula were the garrison and community at Annapolis Royal, the secluded French Acadian settlements in the Annapolis Valley, and scattered fishing ports such as La Have and Canso. The isolated Acadian settlements functioned on a subsistence economy basis producing all their material necessities; as the need arose, they bartered with the Mi'kmaq and traded with the New Englanders for occasional manufactured goods but, in general, they had little need for a circulating currency. Some French gold and silver had entered the economy from the French military and government functionaries at Port Royal but such coins would have been hoarded while others were melted down to make silverware and thereby preserved in the form of "serviceable" bullion protected from governmental revaluations.³⁸ Card money, which was prevalent in other parts of New France, was also issued in Acadia in 1703 as a money substitute to help settle accounts during an acute shortage of other currencies. The Versailles government insisted that card money be withdrawn and specifically prohibited further issuance in the Acadian territory.³⁹ Prohibited or not, one could easily believe that card money was still received within the local French community from its trade with Canada.

After 1710, when Acadia fell to the British for the final time, the garrison at the former Port Royal, now called Annapolis Royal, was largely manned by New Englanders, who for the next 39 years, were essentially the only Anglophones in the province apart from a few merchants and government officials. Nova Scotia was not only a part of the Massachusetts Bay Colony by charter, but also it was solidly within its economic orbit, an association which meant they would not only

³⁴ Brebner, *New England's Outpost*, p.153

³⁵ Shortt, *op. cit.*, #452, #454.

³⁶ Mossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-53.

³⁷ Of interest, this 133.33:100 ratio established by England was the same rate adopted in the 1670s by France for Canada but these rates were set independently of each other (Chalmers, *op. cit.*, pp. 14n, 176.)

³⁸ Peter N. Moogk, "When Money Talks: Coinage in New France," *The Canadian Numismatic Journal* vol. 32, (Feb 1987), p 58.

³⁹ Shortt, *op. cit.*, #16-21; Chalmers, *op. cit.*, pp.176-77.

share a common currency but also face similar fiscal problems. Times were now difficult since, as we previously heard, the Massachusetts treasury had just been obliged to issue more bills of credit to finance the war – again validating the phrase, “money as the ‘sinews of war.’” As Ernst further explains, commerce in Massachusetts, of all the colonies in particular, prospered during Queen Anne’s War with the result that the demands of the local economy outpaced the available money supply. Then, after peace was restored, the withdrawal of English forces, the resultant termination of military expenditures, and less war-related trade with the West Indies, brought about a further contraction of available hard money and credit – a defect reparable by increased emissions of paper money.⁴⁰

A memorandum from Boston written in the fall of 1710 describes the sorry state of currency in that city where, for the prior seven years, silver had been in very short supply having been “... gather’d up to be sent into Great Britayn” Provincial notes were the currency, and “... the little silver ... seldom payes a reckoning att a tavern, or a ferryman, or such trifles.” To compound the hardship of this shortage, anyone who would deign to pass an underweight Spanish dollar of 15 dwt. risked criminal prosecution.⁴¹

This absence of circulating hard money from daily commerce was a concern even at the highest levels as recorded in this 1716 address of the Governor of Massachusetts Bay, Samuel Shute, to the legislature:⁴²

It is my Lot to enter upon the Government at a Time when your Commerce (a very important Article of a People’s Happiness) is under great Discouragement by a universal Want of Money, which is the Medium of Trade.

I must therefore recommend it to you, as a Matter worthy your greatest Application, to find out some effectual Measures to supply this Want, and thereby to restore Trade to a flourishing Condition; in which you shall have my best Endeavors, and hearty Concurrence.

The governor’s lament about the “universal Want of Money” “to restore a flourishing trade” needs to be qualified. (He obviously did not share the same optimism as his predecessor, Governor Dudley.) Although people were reluctant to spend their hard money and despite the fact that little of it entered active circulation, local trade could proceed with the colony’s bills of credit and foreign commerce could be satisfactorily conducted with bills of exchange.

Within the Annapolis Royal community, the circulating currency was no different from that of the rest of New England. The Massachusetts bills of credit issued by the treasury were referred to as “Boston bills,” “Province Bills,”⁴³ or just “Paper Money.” These emissions were denominated in the local money of account called “Boston money” or “current money of New England.”⁴⁴ In the prior century, “New England money,” “Boston money,” or “Bay Colony money” would also have meant Massachusetts silver Willow, Oak and Pine Tree coins since they, too, were denominated


40 Ernst, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

41 A 15 dwt (360 grains) Spanish milled dollar would have been reduced [clipped] by 14¼% from 17.5 dwt (420 grains). Shortt, *op. cit.*, #26. In Massachusetts, a 17 dwt coin was considered full weight (Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 238).

42 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #111.

43 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #28.

44 The Boston bills were very prevalent. Up until 1740, there were 14 re-dated emissions of the October 4, 1713 low denomination notes, 19 re-dated emissions of the mid-value issues, and 14 re-dated emissions of the May 26, 1714 high denominational issues. Newman, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-91.



in Massachusetts money of account.⁴⁵ "Money," depending on the context, could mean hard money, that is, coins, whereas "ready money" referred to any immediate, acceptable form of payment other than a credit relationship.⁴⁶ Also within this currency pool were whatever few foreign coins (especially Spanish, Spanish-American, Portuguese and Brazilian) that would have ventured that far north and French coins from within the Acadian community. There were also commercial bills of exchange drawn on the accounts of Boston merchants computed in the "current money of New England." Accounts with the British government were denominated in English sterling while payments to the Acadians, who supplied the fort with produce, were reckoned in New England money of account no matter by what mechanism the debt was paid which was usually in French coins. For a brief time, French bills of exchange also circulated, having

45 Mossman, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

46 John McCusker, personal communication, April 23, 2003.




Figure 4: This is an example of a printed bill of exchange originating from Saint John, New Brunswick. Although this is from a later period in 1851, it is essentially the same as those used in Annapolis Royal in the 1700s. Here, Captain Charles Boutelle of the ship *Conqueror* (drawer) instructs J. & D. Malcolmson & Co. of Liverpool, England, (drawee) to pay James Phillips of London £800, sterling (payee). In other words, the captain owes Mr. Phillips £800, but instead of sending £800 in specie, he sends Mr. Phillip this bill of exchange. Mr. Phillips presents this note to Malcolmson & Co., where the captain has credit from a freight account, and within sixty days after presentation, they will pay Mr. Phillip his money. On the reverse side, this bill was endorsed by Mr. Phillips and made payable to the Belfast Banking Company. [Shown reduced in size. The actual size is 9 1/4" X 4 3/8".]

been endorsed by the English commandant.⁴⁷ Already the seeds were sown for a complicated monetary environment with three co-existing methods of payment in simultaneous action, but ultimately all these currencies were based on a sterling equivalent. Although the newly printed colonial paper money had its detractors, it was the only currency readily available – and Gresham's Law notwithstanding – it was a classic example of "necessity being the mother of invention."⁴⁸ It is to be emphasized, that any quoted price had no bearing at all on which variety of available currency would eventually settle the debt.

Unfortunately for the garrison at Annapolis Royal, its financial situation was bleak since the bills of exchange, which purchased its supplies from Boston, were very slow to be honored by the British Treasury while other bills were returned unaccepted and protested.⁴⁹ In part, this indifference about the prompt settlement of debts incurred in support of the garrison stemmed from an internal dispute as to whether these funds should come from metropolitan or colonial coffers. Another factor in this apathy is the inherently dilatory character of a bureaucratic military establishment responding on its own schedule. A vicious cycle was in operation: the longer merchants had to wait for their just payment, the more it cost the garrison for credit, and, no doubt, the steeper was the price for whatever they did buy since we read claims that the prices charged

47 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #29.

48 Gresham's Law states that when two currencies are in circulation with equal debt paying power, but of unequal intrinsic value, the better currency tends to be hoarded, or bad money drives good money out of circulation. This economic principle was attributed to Thomas Gresham (1519-79), a financial adviser to Queen Elizabeth.

49 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #51.

to the military were exorbitant⁵⁰ – as compared to the civilian market – and that the quality of the goods furnished was frequently unsatisfactory.⁵¹ If an agent had to wait six to eight months for the redemption of accepted bills of exchange drawn in his favor, this cash flow problem could easily cause bankruptcy.⁵² Reimbursement for their goods became such an ordeal, Boston merchants refused to extend any further credit and the garrison was supplied only by promises and advances on the personal credit of the officers and commandant, who were reduced to begging for the necessities of life from the military establishment in Boston. To compound these deplorable conditions, the troops, already many months arrears in their pay, were in extreme need: they lacked adequate food, bedding, equipment, were housed in tents due to deteriorating barracks, and went practically naked for lack of proper clothing. The governor at Annapolis Royal feared that the fort might have to be abandoned and that more troops would desert or possibly mutiny.⁵³ Finally, in June 1717, seven years after the initial occupation of the fort, the Lords of Trade acknowledged responsibility for these long overdue accounts and recommended a fiscal management plan for future expenses whereby the local officers could draw bills of exchange against the funds appropriated by Parliament for support of the garrison.⁵⁴

In a typical procedure for drawing a bill of exchange, the garrison at Annapolis would buy a bill from a merchant or organization in Boston with credit deposited in London, at the going commercial rate of exchange, in order to purchase British goods. (See Appendix II.) In 1700, only the paper bill would be at risk crossing the Atlantic rather than the merchant's silver. One observer calculated that a merchant would be served better by using bills of exchange since he would avoid the insurance costs required on a specie shipment, which would have amounted from 1% to 4% of total value (summer to winter) between Halifax and New York.⁵⁵ Such bills were issued in the original and two or three copies so that if the original were lost, the others could be negotiated in succession. Only the first bill presented was ever paid, the remainder becoming automatically invalid. Bills were payable usually within thirty days of presentation. We read that these Annapolis bills drawn on the English government were very slow to be honored in London and therefore subject to interest and penalties payable to the creditor. This added significantly to the expense of doing business and since merchants were reluctant to accept these bills, an available source of credit was denied. These bills were particularly useful as a means to buy a supply of hard money to pay troops and settle minor debts in coin.

Besides the problems created by these unpaid bills of exchange, New England was suffering from other financial woes. As previously described, Nova Scotia and the Massachusetts Bay Colony evolved along the eastern seaboard of British North America, united politically by a charter, and joined geographically by the District of Maine.⁵⁶ You could imagine them as Siamese twins, New England and New Scotland, but where practically all vital activity emanated from Boston upon whom the weaker northernmost sibling was particularly dependent for its sustenance. Rawlyk describes this dominant relationship of Massachusetts over Nova Scotia in the terms of a

50 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #45, #92, #94, #101. As an interesting vignette: when it was learned that the usual beer ration for the troops stationed in Nova Scotia would freeze in the severe winters they requested rum. As a result, the price for rum charged to the government escalated from 2 to 3s. per gallon to 6s.

51 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #91, #93.

52 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #44, #48.

53 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #53, #55.

54 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #109.

55 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #353. In 1751, the cost of insuring £2500, sterling, in hard money from New York to Halifax to pay troops was actually £200 or 8% (Shortt, #367).

56 Even though a slip of New Hampshire is interposed, New Hampshire was very much under the influence of Boston, who, early on, made a power play to annex the colony (Jordan, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41, 247.) In spite of this close relationship with Massachusetts, the Board of Trade encouraged Nova Scotia to pattern its form of government after the royal colony of Virginia (Brebner, *New England's Outpost*, pp. 73, 134, 173, 239, 241).

“continuing economic hammerlock.”⁵⁷ As a matter of fact, all the New England colonies marched to the beat of Massachusetts’ financial drum. From 1726 to 1729 the colonies as a whole were in a phase of economic contraction but New England,⁵⁸ in particular, was burdened with a crippling war debt, diminished exports, and monetary inflation. We have already seen how Massachusetts had to print money to survive the monetary drain from two failed offensives against Canada and the frustration endured in obtaining financial support from the metropolitan authorities for Annapolis Royal. The negative consequence of these factors upon the New England economy was the depreciation of its currency in terms of sterling value so that the commercial exchange rate on London had risen from £135.00, Massachusetts money of account, to £100.00 sterling in 1705, to £291.98 in 1727. As a consequence of Gresham’s Law, hard money was withdrawn from circulation and, as previously noted, the only currency found in commerce was the New England colonies’ inflated bills of credit.

But not everyone suffered from these economic doldrums as recorded in two 1715 documents describing how trade in Acadia was monopolized by a small group who realized from 300 to 400% profits on merchandise.⁵⁹ Business in Nova Scotia was considerably more expensive than in Boston where such goods sold at a mere 150% markup. These exorbitant prices encouraged the local Acadians to trade with Louisbourg. Even though the prices for their purchased goods were quoted in money, this implied nothing as to the nature of the settlement of the debts which could be in specie, marketable dried cod fish, or “... good bills of Exchange drawn on such persons as by the said Thomas Cox shall be approved of & Accepted”⁶⁰ Nothing had changed by 1720 when there was still no hard money in circulation and it was reported that local merchants who could not pay their suppliers were indebted to them by as much as £200 to £300 and the merchants in turn “having the same Sums or more Owen (*sic*) them by the Inhabitants or people at the Garrison whom they Sold the Goods to.”⁶¹ Some New England merchants, on the other hand, conducted a thriving fish and fur export trade with the West Indies and Mediterranean ports reaping in from 400 to 500% profits!⁶² It was all too evident that some proper Bostonians were viewing Acadia in the same way a farmer views his cow! Because there were frequent delays in receiving Boston money to pay the troops, the use of paymaster’s notes as money was adopted as an expedient to bridge between payday and paying day when the ship carrying the payroll actually docked.⁶³ The French Acadians in the region continued trade with their Francophone comrades at Louisbourg providing the towns and fort on *Île Royale* with corn, live cattle, and provisions for which the Acadians received imported woolens and linens⁶⁴ and French coin. In regard to the latter, the Acadians hoarded their earnings in hard money which they sent off to Boston for their purchases where they received a better exchange rate than in Nova Scotia.⁶⁵

6. French coins in Annapolis Royal; more money problems

On May 19, 1727, it was recorded in the minutes of the governor’s council at Annapolis Royal that “... the merchants [were] endeavoring to lower the value of French coin, ‘the only currency we have

57 Rawlyk, *op. cit.*, p. xiii.

58 McCusker and Menard, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.

59 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #91, #95.

60 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #165. Care was exercised as from whom bills of exchange would be received.

61 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #127.

62 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #131.

63 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #139, 143.

64 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #131.

65 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #188.

amongst us.”⁶⁶ To prevent this unauthorized reduction in value, the council issued a proclamation declaring “that all the different species of French coin, both of silver and gold, be paid and received in all payments within this H.M. Prov. of N.S. at the same rates they have been usually paid and received ... for these past six months.” In refusing to endorse a *de facto* devaluation which originated in the market place, the council specifically mentioned that “all the afores’d. coins be continued at their former value, especially the new crowns stamp with four double LL’s, [which pass] at 12s. 6d.”⁶⁷

The pronouncement that “... all the different species of French coin, both of silver and gold ...” indicates that the governor’s council intended that *all* French coins – in this case silver *écus* – regardless of “species” were to pass at the established rate of 12s. 6d. Three things are apparent here: the governor’s council was empowered to set the rate of exchange for coins, which it was attempting to do; that the rate of 12s. 6d. was quoted in Massachusetts, Old Tenor, (O.T.), at the inflated value of Massachusetts bills of credit; and that they were going to treat all French crowns the same notwithstanding any differences in silver content, including the new variety “with four double LL’s.” The complexity of the situation makes it necessary to review briefly the history of French crowns in relationship to the inflationary pressures on New England’s (including Nova Scotia⁶⁸) currency.

The interval from 1679 to 1720 had been a very disordered period of French monetary history when several recoinages and revaluations occurred. Specie coins had frequently fluctuated in weight and value primarily as a compensation for a fluctuating bimetallic standard⁶⁹ and later as a response to the collapse of the John Law’s “Mississippi bubble” scheme (1720) in its failure to reduce the public debt incurred as a result of the extravagances during the reign of Louis XIV. During this period, Shaw recorded ten revaluations of the silver *louis d’argent* (crowns or *écus*)!⁷⁰ The *écu aux huit L*, which this proclamation singled out for mention, was the most recently minted issue (1724-1726) and was significantly lighter than the more valuable previous emissions. It seems that the council wanted this new, lighter coin to pass at the customary rate for all previous French crowns that had been in effect for the prior six months despite the fact, as we will see, that the merchants were justified in proposing a reduction for this newest and lightweight variety.

Until 1709, the current French crowns passed in England at 54d., the value stated in the Proclamation of 1704. The next emission, the *écu aux trois couronnes* (1709-1715) was somewhat more substantial with a silver value equivalent to 60.44d., sterling. From 1718 until the recoinage of 1726, an event which finally stabilized French specie coins until the Revolution,⁷¹ the *écu* oscillated anywhere from five to nine *livres*, reaching a low point with the aforementioned *écu aux huit L* at only four *livres* in French money, or an equivalent 46.59d. in sterling.⁷² So it appears

66 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #173, 19 May 1727.

67 These coins certainly appear to be the Louis XV issues, *Ciani* 2112, minted from 1724 to 1725. Louis Ciani, *Les Monnaies Royales Françaises de Hugues Capet A Louis XVI* (Paris 1926, repr. 1969).

68 McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, pp. 138-45, 231.

69 Chalmers, *op. cit.*, pp. 397-98.

70 W. A. Shaw, *The History of Currency 1252 to 1884* (New York, repr of 2nd ed., 1896), pp. 167-69, 422-23. In this paper, no attempt will be made to discuss the frequent, and often complicated revaluations of French currency either in the mother country or colonies. Attention is invited to Moogk’s outline of the Canadian Rating for the *sols marqués* appearing in his comprehensive article, “When Money Talks,” p. 64.

71 Chalmers, *op. cit.*, p. 404; W. A. Shaw, *op. cit.*; Oscar G. Schilke and Raphael E. Solomon, *America’s Foreign Coins* (New York, 1964), p. 144.

72 Ciani, *passim*; Mossman, *op. cit.* pp. 50, 73. In this instance, the *livre* was not an actual coin but only a money of account in which the value of other coins was computed.

likely that the Nova Scotia merchants who were “endeavoring to lower the value of French coin” were alert to the fact that this newly minted light *écu* had a decreased intrinsic value as compared to the more robust prior issues. Their efforts to impose an appropriate differential were opposed by the governor’s council who strove to “cry-up” the value of the weak *écu aux huit L* and thus keep silver coins in the province by the time-proven maneuver of overvaluation.⁷³ It will be an interesting exercise to calculate the extent of the overvaluation of this controversial *écu aux huit L* issue to understand the objection of the merchants in actual fiscal terms.

To start, the computations are in Old Tenor (O.T.), money of account – meaning the inflated paper currency of Massachusetts. The 1641-1709 varieties of French crowns (*écus*) were valued at 54d., sterling (coincidentally the same rate as the Spanish American eight reales) and in New England they passed at 72d., the one-third advance prescribed by the Proclamation of 1704. As inflation eroded the New England economy, this former rate of 6s Proc. (72d.) for French crowns had increased to 12s. 6d. (150d.) in Annapolis Royal – no longer as Proclamation money but now quoted in inflated Old Tenor. With this increase from 72d. to 150d., the new exchange rate for the coin was set *de jure* by the governor’s council at £277.78 : £100, sterling, a dramatic increase from the Proclamation setting of £133.33, Massachusetts money of account, to £100, sterling. This £277.78 agrees very closely with the commercial rate of £285.00 : £100 for bills of exchange given for May 1727,⁷⁴ when all this controversy took place.

In examining three varieties of French crowns, we can analyze their values and why the merchants wanted a different rate.⁷⁵

Coins	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.
<i>Louis d'argent</i> 1641-1709	388.0	54.14	72.18	150	(12s. 6d.)	0
<i>Écu aux trois couronnes</i> 1709-1718	432.8	60.44	80.58	167.9	(14s.)	-11.9%
<i>Écu aux huit L</i> 1724-1726	333.64	46.59	62.12	129.4	(10s. 9½d.)	+13.7%

A. Weight of pure silver content in grains.

B. The value in pence, sterling (1704, England) – note that the theoretical 54.14d. was reduced to 54d.

C. The value in New England Proclamation money in pence, 1704 – again the 72.18d. was set at 72d.

D. The effect of inflation in 1727 on the theoretical Proc. rate (Column C) in pence – the *louis d'argent* being used as standard. The 12s. 6d. (O.T.) rate was established for *all* French crowns in Annapolis Royal.

E. Column E is Column D expressed in shillings and pence, Mass. money in O.T.

F. The discrepancy in valuation when the specific crown passed at 12s. 6d. rate without consideration as to intrinsic value of the different crowns.

Note: The heavy *écu aux trois couronnes* were undervalued by 11.9% while the light *écu aux huit L* were overvalued by 13.7%.

73 This “crying-up” or “raising of the moneys” was a commonly used expedient for increasing the value of money in any region that practiced it. If “cried-up” coins had greater buying power in a particular locality, citizens were less apt to export hard money for foreign payment but use other forms of currency, i.e. bills of exchange. This was well summarized by Rice Vaughn, “For say they, If we do observe those States which do soonest and most raise their Money, we shall find that they do most abound with Money; and that Trader and Manufacturer do most flourish there” (Chalmers, *op. cit.*, p. 7n).

74 McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, p. 140.

75 Sample computation:

Mass. exchange rate: London rate = value of *écu aux huit L* in Nova Scotia: sterling value

£277.78:£100 = x : 46.59d.

x = 129.42d. = 10s. 9½d.

150d. – 129.42d. = 20.58d. = 1s. 9½d. overvaluation [13.7%]

This almost 14% overvaluation would be sufficient to make any Yankee merchant wince, whether he lived in Boston or had recently uprooted to Nova Scotia. Their request to have the new variety “with four double LL’s” reduced from 12s. 6d. was indeed well founded. We have no indication that the older *écus aux trois couronnes* were in current circulation.

The 1727 report from the governor’s council indicated that French gold and silver coins were “... the only [hard] currency we have amongst us.” The source of this money which ended up in the hands of English merchants is no mystery, since, proscriptions to the contrary notwithstanding, there was an active clandestine trade between Nova Scotia and Louisbourg⁷⁶ where construction on the fortress had been in progress since 1719. The Acadian farmers also benefited from a continuing relationship with their countrymen on *Île Royale* by supplying them with farm produce; their commerce was another conduit which accounted for the presence of French coins in the Annapolis region. By 1726 the population on *Île Royale* had increased to about 3,000 in 13 distinct communities which had sprung up on the island. Trade, both legal and otherwise,⁷⁷ flourished and Louisbourg functioned virtually like a free port at the center of North Atlantic trade thanks in part to its ice-free harbor.

Another shipment of French specie coins was not as lucky as the quantity of *écus aux huit L* and unidentified French gold coins which were the subject of the 1727 proclamation. In 1725, the French naval transport, *Le Chameau*, sank in a gale just 12 miles from her destination at Louisbourg. The 82,000 *livres tournois* she carried were destined for New France to bolster the sagging economy and retire the promissory “playing card” money that circulated in Canada. Her precious cargo, not recovered until 1965, consisted mainly of gold *louis mirlitons*, dated 1723 to 1725,⁷⁸ and *écus aux huit L* from 1724 and 1725, mostly from the Bordeaux and La Rochelle mints. In his research, Hodder concluded that contrary to other opinions, these specific gold and silver issues were not exclusively struck for colonial circulation, but rather were metropolitan French coins of which a certain quantity were exported for use in New France.⁷⁹ Although both the gold *louis mirlitons* and the silver *écus aux huit L* were minted at the required alloy (22 carat and 916.6 fine, respectively), they were lighter than all the other coins in their respective series, a condition which was to be shortly rectified by the recoinage of 1726.⁸⁰ So if these issues had not been sent to New France, they would either have been melted and recoinage at the mint or would have circulated at a lower rate than the standardized coinages from 1726 to 1785 (gold) or 1793 (silver).

There is no specific identification of the French gold coins mentioned in this 1727 Annapolis Royal report but within these early sources reference is frequently made to French *pistoles*.⁸¹ Although a Spanish *pistole* was a definite gold coin of two escudos, the French *pistole* was much less precise. Wesley O’Neill, in his scholarly paper on French coinages mentioned in literature, states that the word *pistole* came into being in 1640 during the reign of Louis XIII. This was the time when the Spanish gold *pistole* and silver piece-of-eight *reales* threatened to dominate the French monetary system and as a counteraction, the French created a gold coin of approximately the

76 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #169.

77 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #167, #169, #191, #195, #234.

78 Ciani #2083

79 Bowers, *op. cit.*, “The Wreck of the *Chameau*,” pp. 157-58.; see also Michael J. Hodder, “An American Collector’s Guide to the Coins of Nouvelle France,” *Canada’s Money*, Coinage of the America’s Conference, #8 (New York, 1994), pp. 1-35.

80 Chalmers, *op. cit.*, pp. 404, 409-10.

81 Shortt, *op. cit.*; #25, #29, #185, #188, #262.



Figure 5: This 1725 *écu aux huit L* (Ciani 2112) from the Rennes mint (mint mark “9”) was the subject of the 1727 controversy in Annapolis Royal between the governor’s council and the local merchants. Coins from this series minted in La Rochelle and Bordeaux were salvaged from *Le Chameau*. This example weighs 361.03 grains with the authorized weigh of 364 grains and an assay weight of 362 grains. [Shown actual size.] *Courtesy American Numismatic Society.*



Figure 6: This 1723 *Louis d’or aux mirlitons* (Ciani 2082) is of the type recovered from the wreck of *Le Chameau*. This variety was known to have circulated in Nova Scotia and was commonly called a French *pistole*. [Shown actual size.] *Courtesy American Numismatic Society.*

same weight as the Spanish *pistole* and valued it at ten *livres*.⁸² This new arrival was the French *pistole* but when newer issues depicted the king’s bust, the denomination became known as a *louis d’or*. After 1672 the French *pistole* became a money of account of ten *livres*.⁸³ In a 1730 document,⁸⁴ which confirmed the commission paid to the rent collector for the French properties along the Bay of Fundy, it specifically stated that “the pistole is 10 francs ...” where *francs* means the same as *livres*. Willey presents a convincing argument that after 1723 when the term French *pistoles* is used to refer to an actual coin, the contemporaneous understanding would be gold *mirlitons* of Louis XV which we have already discussed. (See Table 2.)

There is only scattered documentary evidence as to other coins circulating in Nova Scotia. One such fragment of information comes from a 1743/4 inventory of an estate in Annapolis Royal.⁸⁵ Of the 126 items listed with an aggregate value at over £540, Old Tenor,⁸⁶ Massachusetts money of account, only three lots were coins; one English guinea valued at £5 15s., O.T.; 26 English halfpence at 6s. 6d., O.T.; and 130 French “pennies” at 3d. each (390d., O.T.) at £1 12s. 6d., O.T. This

was a time when inflation was running rampant in Massachusetts and by examining these equivalent sums in sterling and Boston money, one can calculate that the current exchange rate allowed for these few coins. The gold guinea, of 21s., sterling, was allowed 115s., O.T., which translates into a rate of exchange of Boston on London at £547.62 Massachusetts, money of account to £100, sterling. For the 26 humble halfpence, i.e. 13d., sterling, the exchange calculates at £600:£100. These values agree closely with published commercial quotations of Massachu-

82 E. Wesley O’Neill, Jr., “French Coinage in History,” *The French Review*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 (October, 1965), pp. 1-14. The legislated mint weight of the French *pistole* was 104.2 grains while for the Spanish it was 104.4 grains, although in Newton’s 1702 assay, they were both equal at 104.0 grains (Chalmers, *op. cit.*, pp. 395-98).

83 R. C. Willey, “The French Nine Penny Piece and Other Strange Beasts,” *The Canadian Numismatic Journal*, vol. 18 (1973), p. 283.

84 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #185.

85 Shortt, *op. cit.*; #236.

86 There were three different monies of account for Massachusetts paper currency which had a fixed relationship to each other. Old Tenor notes, abbreviated O.T., were the earliest emissions of paper money, then Middle Tenor, or M.T., in 1737, and lastly New Tenor, or N.T., after 1742. Middle Tenor (or Three Fold Tenor) was rated at 1 to 3 O.T. and New Tenor 1 to 4 O.T. McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, p.18n., 133-34; Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 474.

setts on London,⁸⁷ suggesting that hard money traded more as a commodity than coins at an established rate.

To determine the value of the 130 French “pennies,” or copper *sous*,⁸⁸ which equaled 1.3 *écu* (five *livres* to the *écu* after 1726), the computation is more involved, since one must convert O.T. Massachusetts money of account to sterling and then the sterling to French *écus*, employing two sets of exchange rates which multiplies the chance for inaccuracy and/or cheating the customer. Assuming the same rate of £600:£100 was afforded the French coppers as the English halfpence:

390d.O.T. @ £600 O.T : £100 sterling = 65.0d. sterling
 65.0d. sterling ÷ 1.3 *écu* (i.e. 130 *sous* @ 100 to the *écu*) = 50d., sterling, per *écu*
 which closely approximates the prevailing commercial rate of 54.5d., sterling, per *écu*.⁸⁹

In another transaction, where Acadians from *Grand Pré* were permitted to pay their quit-rents in *livres*, only 2½d. (2.48d.) were allowed per *sou*, rather than the 3d. imposed on the Annapolis Royal estate, indicative of the opportunities for the advantageous or discriminatory manipulation of exchange rates.⁹⁰

7. The first fall and recovery of Louisbourg

By 1738, Louisbourg was a thriving colony and trading center even for New England merchants. According to the documents from Annapolis Royal, French silver coins continued as the primary hard money in Nova Scotia while Massachusetts bills were still the usual paper currency which by this date were the New Tenor (N.T.) issues (*vide infra*). This prosperity came to a halt as France's peaceable relationship with England ended as the War of the Austrian Succession (1744-48) erupted in Europe and the hostilities extended in the New World as King George's War. Always concerned about the presence of the Louisbourg fortress so close to their borders, a combined British and New England force took advantage of this conflict to overwhelm and capture the fort in 1745. To enable the New England provinces to finance their military obligations, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Massachusetts each issued additional bills of credit.⁹¹ To raise additional funds for the war effort, Massachusetts initiated a colony-sponsored lottery. As reported by Felt for January 9, 1745, “Pressed on all sides with the demands on their Treasury for the war, and not having sufficient funds to satisfy them, the Government resort to the doubtful method of raising £7,500 by a Lottery.”⁹²

For the New Englanders to capture the garrison was one thing, but to find the available funds to pay and supply the occupying troops was another matter. History was repeating itself since, due to no available money and strained credit, the military had to scratch to find the wherewithal to support the occupying soldiers who typically demanded their wages in hard money! The fruits of this victory again quickly evaporated since no more than three years after the conquest, the 1748 Treaty of *Aix-La-Chapelle* restored Louisbourg to the French in exchange for Madras in India. With this return to the *status quo ante bellum*, the French presence in Acadia resumed.

87 The rate for the first three months of 1744 was £573.33:100 and for June was £600:100, Massachusetts on London. There were no figures reported for April and May 1744. McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, p. 141.

88 The other common minor French copper coin was the *liard* of three *deniers* at four to the *sou* or *sol*.

89 McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, pp. 87, 87n.

90 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #454.

91 For Massachusetts these were the issue of June 20, 1744 (Newman, pp. 200-201). For New Hampshire and Rhode Island, see Newman, pp. 230, 384.

92 Felt, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-17.




Figure 7: This June 20, 1744 Massachusetts Bay Colony note for six pence belonged to an emission that financed the first offensive against Louisbourg. This and all other outstanding bills were redeemed in silver within one year after March 31, 1750, from the specie remitted to the colony by Parliament to reimburse for war expenses. [Shown reduced in size. Actual size is 3 5/8" X 4 3/4".] Courtesy Eric P. Newman Numismatic Education Society.

8. Paper money in British North America

Frequent mention has been made of the Massachusetts bills of credit and how over the years their value had been eroded by progressive inflation, due in a large part to the need to finance the colony's growing war debt. In response to these progressive inflationary pressures, which by 1737 had reached £500, Massachusetts money, to £100, sterling, Massachusetts paper money underwent a one-third revaluation. This new money, first emitted in 1737, was at a ratio to the Old Tenor of one to three, hence the name, Three Fold Tenor or New Tenor (N.T.). (Between 1740 and 1742, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire also prescribed a similar devaluation for their Old Tenor bills.) The inflationary trend continued unabated such that by 1744, a second revaluation was ordered; this time the ratio was four Old Tenor bills to one Second New Tenor, or Four Fold Tenor. These Second New Tenor issues supplied a large variety of low denominational currency particularly needed for low cost daily necessities. All these bills circulated together and hence the necessity for a name change: the Three Fold Tenor, or New Tenor of 1737, later became known as Middle Tenor, while the Second New Tenor, or Four Fold Tenor of 1744 was simply New Tenor.⁹³ All prices and monies of account were still kept in O.T. but an indebtedness could be satisfied by any combination of bills of credit or other currencies. An example of a complicated payment scheme was evident in the 1745 Massachusetts lottery reported above by Felt. The prescribed condition for anyone buying a ticket, which sold at 30s each, was that the purchaser "...pay this sum, one fifth in the new tenor [second N.T.], or in old tenor bills at four for

⁹³ Newman, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

one, and the other four fifths in the same paper [second N.T. or O.T.], or in any of New England not prohibited."⁹⁴

In a summary of the paper currency circulating in the British Colonies in 1740, William Douglas, an avowed foe of bills of credit, described the current status in Nova Scotia.⁹⁵

In NOVA SCOTIA: The Sterling Bills of Exchange on the pay of the Troops, Garrison, and Train, Supply there with what they may have occasion for from *New England*: Small Dealings are in *New England publick Bills*, and in *French coin* from Cape Breton; one *Livre* equal 4s. New England Currency: at Canso Fish and Oil are purchased by *Bills of Exchange New England Money* upon Boston.

Douglas continued in regard to New England as he diagnosed the root cause of the inflated currency:

*The repeated large Emissions of Paper Money are the Cause of the frequent rise of the Price of Silver and Exchange; that is, of the publick Bill of Currency depreciating in all the Paper Money Colonies;*⁹⁶ which do as regularly follow the same, as the Tides do the *Phases* or course of the Moon. When no larger Sums are emitted for some Time, than what are cancelled of former Emissions; Silver and Exchange are at a Stand; when less is emitted than cancelled (which seldom happens) Silver and Exchange do fall. This is plain to a kind of Demonstration, from the Instance in the History of our Paper Money Emissions in *New England*.

Reporting on colonial paper money, there appeared in an issue of the *Gentleman's Magazine* published in England that same year a brief résumé of the commercial exchange rates for ten of the mainland British North American colonies – i.e. the value of their individual monies of account in terms of £100, sterling. New England money under ideal circumstances should have been rated at £133.33 : £100, sterling, but because of its war indebtedness and decreased trade it was severely depreciated in comparison with their Middle Atlantic neighbors. This differential demonstrates there was not a single economy for the colonies as a group but that the local colonial economies were determined by regional factors and functioned independently in relationship to each other and the mother country. Nova Scotia's economy moved with New England until 1750.

94 For an interesting commentary on this lottery, see Louis Jordan, "Massachusetts Lottery," at <http://www.coins.nd.edu/ColCurrency/CurrencyText/MA-44descrip.html>, last accessed 24 April 2003.

95 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #224.

96 The "paper money" colonies in 1740 would have been Massachusetts (1690), South Carolina (1703), New York, New Hampshire, Connecticut and New Jersey (1709), Rhode Island (1710), North Carolina (1712), Pennsylvania (1723), Delaware and Maryland (1733).

New England ⁹⁷	£525	money of account to £100 sterling
Massachusetts Bay		
Connecticut		
Rhode Island		
New Hampshire		
[and Nova Scotia]		
New York	£160	money of account to £100 sterling
The Jerseys ⁹⁸	£160	money of account to £100 sterling
Pennsylvania	£170	money of account to £100 sterling
Maryland	£200	money of account to £100 sterling
North Carolina ⁹⁹	£1400	money of account to £100 sterling
South Carolina ¹⁰⁰	£800	money of account to £100 sterling

Table 1: Value of Colonial Paper Moneys, March 1740: from the *Gentleman's Magazine* (Shortt, *op. cit.* #223).

Felt, in speaking of the burden of the Massachusetts bills of credit, noted that "Such notes have fallen much since February 14, 1745, when the first order was passed by Massachusetts to emit them for the expedition [against Louisbourg] ... that the great depreciation of our paper was owing to the distress occasioned by that expedition" This was "the straw that broke the camel's back" which set Parliament to working on a scheme to redeem Massachusetts' inflated currency and rescue the colony from financial ruin. The British government finally acknowledged the need for intervention. Elated at the prospect that Parliament would intercede, the Chief Magistrate of Massachusetts wrote to a friend,¹⁰¹

I am glad Massachusetts is like to be retrieved from her bankrupt circumstances by the interposition of the British Parliament, in a just reimbursement of their charge in the conquest of Cape Breton. So my dear native country again may sit as a queen among the Provinces.

The year 1749 was notable on two accounts, one financial and the other political. In that year Parliament reimbursed Massachusetts for the years of monetary drain she had endured in support of the various offensives against New France, especially the most recent Cape Breton campaign of 1745. On September 18, 1749, the ship *Mermaid* arrived in Boston with 650,000 ounces of

97 The four New England colonies had an integrated economy in which Massachusetts tended to set the norm which extended from the Connecticut River Valley to the Bay of Fundy. The rate of £525:£100 from this contemporaneous popular magazine agrees with McCusker's extensive tables (McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, pp. 131, 140).

98 The Jerseys refer to East and West New Jersey, the economy of the former following New York while the West followed Philadelphia. These three areas, NY, NJ and PA, had much less inflation with more silver available and less dependence on paper currency.

99 North Carolina had an enormous depreciation of currency similar to New England. McCusker's data list the 1740 rate at essentially £1000 to £100, a situation which improved considerably after 1750 (McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, pp. 215-19).

100 South Carolina did not deflate its paper money which from 1723 until the Revolution was stable at £700, SC money of account, to £100 sterling, a figure less than that quoted in the *Gentleman's Magazine* (McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, pp. 220-24.)

101 Felt, *op. cit.*, p.120.

Spanish silver and ten tons of English halfpence and farthings, mostly dated 1749. With this supply of specie, the colony was able to retire all its inflated paper money in March 1750 at a rate of 45s. O.T., or 11s. 3d. N.T., to the dollar. Any contract after that date would be settled at 6s. (Proc.) to the dollar, the rate established pursuant to the Proclamation of 1704. The circulation of bills from other colonies was also prohibited and, until the Revolution, Massachusetts functioned with hard money, earning the epithet, "hard money Colony."¹⁰² This initiative taken by Massachusetts to free its economy from the "evils" of inflated paper money was further strengthened by Parliament's Currency Act of 1751 which severely restricted further emissions of paper currency in New England, a law primarily aimed at curbing Rhode Island's liberal paper money practices. Thus ended the era of inflated Boston bills – and those issues from the other New England colonies as well – which had served the needs of Nova Scotia for so many years. Additional subsidies from Parliament, totaling £315,000, were sent in 1756 and 1762 to reimburse the colonies as "a free gift and reward for past services against the French" – but this amount only covered about one-fourth of the actual local expenses incurred in the four French and Indian wars.¹⁰³

9. Trade with Louisbourg; French money within the English colonies

On the Atlantic coast during these relatively peaceful years 1748 to 1754, Louisbourg, after its return to the French, quickly recovered its prosperity and grew economically, enjoying an active trading partnership with New England. New Englanders and others colonists were finding it profitable to trade with Louisbourg, much to the consternation of Halifax, with as many as 150 vessels from New York, Philadelphia, Rhode Island and Boston visiting the port in 1751. By the following year, this number had increased to 156 ships from Boston alone!¹⁰⁴ This could account for the presence of French money in those cities where French crowns and gold were commonly listed in the published exchange rates. The following table, adapted from Franklin's 1750 *Pocket Almanac*, was a published guide intended to provide its eighteenth century readers with an up-to-date reckoning of the current value of foreign coins circulating in areas under the influence of the Philadelphia market. Similar tables for 1759 and 1761 added English crowns (least weight 456 grains) to the list, and valued them the same as *écus* and pieces-of-eight at 7s. 6d.

Listed in Table 2 are French guineas and crowns some of which we can speculate entered local commerce via the thriving trade with Louisbourg. The third row from the bottom notes the bimetallic standard which at that time was 1:15.04, gold to silver. In the second column is the rate at which the coins passed in Philadelphia where they were valued in local money of account. The third column lists the minimum weight necessary for a coin to pass by tale at the prescribed value;¹⁰⁵ any piece clipped or otherwise reduced below that level would pass by weight according to the established rates for gold and silver in the bottom two rows. The final column, added by the author, lists for comparison the full authorized weight of the non-clipped coins fresh from the mint.¹⁰⁶ Obviously, a money scale would have been a necessary accoutrement for even the most basic business transaction. In Philadelphia in 1750, we see that the par of exchange for the universal monetary standard, the Spanish milled dollar, was legislated at a ratio of 1.67, Pennsylvania money of account, to 1.00, sterling, a year when the commercial rate averaged £170.65, Pennsylvania money, to £100, sterling,¹⁰⁷ a very close approximation to the established par of exchange for hard money.

¹⁰² Mossman, *op. cit.*, p. 100; Shortt, *op. cit.*, #299.

¹⁰³ Felt, *op. cit.*, pp. 140, 150.

¹⁰⁴ Moogk, *La Nouvelle France*, p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ Other tables of exchange explain that a gold coin could lack no more than two grains from its mint weight to pass by tale (*Ames Almanack*, 1762; Anderson, *Rhode Island Almanac* 1775).

¹⁰⁶ Not a part of Franklin's original table; data from Mossman, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

¹⁰⁷ McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, p. 185.

World Coins	Value £ s. d.	Least Weight dwt. gr. (grains)	Full Weight in grains
English Guineas at	1 14 0	5 0 (120)	129.4
French Guineas	1 13 0	5 5 (125)	125.9
Moidores	2 3 6	6 18 (162)	166.0
Johannes's	5 15 0	18 8 (440)	442.6
Half Johannes's	2 17 6	9 4 (220)	221.1
Carolines	1 14 0	6 5 (149)	149.0
Dutch or German Ducats	0 14 0	2 4 (52)	53.5
French Milled Pistoles	1 6 6	4 4 (100)	100.7
Spanish Pistoles	1 7 0	4 6 (102)	104.4
Arabian Chequins	0 13 6	2 3 (51)	53.75
Other Gold Coin, per ounce	6 5 0		-
Spanish Milled Pieces of 8	0 7 6	17 6 (414)	417.6
French Silver Crowns	0 7 6	17 6 (414)	423.3
Other good coined Spanish Silver, per ounce	0 8 6		-
The Proportion of Gold to Silver, in England is, as	1 : 15 1/25 th		-
1 Ounce Troy of Gold (22 carat) is worth sterling	3 17 8½		-
1 Ounce Sterling Silver	0 5 2		-

Table 2: A Table of the Value and Weight of Coins, as they now pass in Pennsylvania (from Franklin's 1750 *Pocket Almanac*).

The French guinea noted in Table 2 was a common term for the *louis d'or* while the coin with the closest weight to the French milled *pistole*¹⁰⁸ is the *louis mirliton*, already discussed. The French silver crown, of the same weight and value as the Spanish eight *reales* at 7s. 6d., would have been the *louis d'argent* of 60 *sols* from 1641-1709, which was cited in the preparation of the Proclamation of 1704. It is evident that neither the heavy French crown, *écu aux trois couronnes* (1709-18) nor the light *écu aux huit L*, we previously discussed in Annapolis Royal, were mentioned in this 1750 table, suggesting they were not in common circulation. Thus in 1750 the three major silver coins of the period, the Spanish milled dollar, and the French and English crowns all traded at par in Philadelphia – although calculation of their relative silver content will show that the French and English crowns were slightly undervalued. It is to be recalled that the par of exchange for hard money, as indicated in Table 2, was fixed by legislation and did not fluctuate as did the commercial rate for bills of exchange which were far more responsive to the prevailing economic climate.

108 The term "milled" would exclude any older hammered issues.

10. The settlement of Halifax

The second important event in 1749 was the settlement of Halifax. The English government, still licking its wounds over the loss of Louisbourg at the bargaining table, realized the importance of setting up a buffer zone between New England and New France. That buffer zone was to be Nova Scotia, and it was to assume a role similar to that which Georgia played between the southern colonies and Spanish Florida.¹⁰⁹ It was that year, with the founding of Halifax and the relocation of the seat of government from Annapolis Royal, that colonization of Nova Scotia began in earnest, gradually transforming it from a satellite of Massachusetts to a colony in its own right.¹¹⁰ The challenge for the English government, in order to strengthen its dominance in the region, was to recruit loyal, industrious people who would work hard to establish a prosperous colony and yet could be trusted to support the British in their continuing quarrel with the French. It was imperative that these pioneers be Protestant to prevent any possible collusion with the French Roman Catholics. During this period, the excellent harbor at Chebucto, on Nova Scotia's eastern shore, largely went ignored until 1749, when the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations (hereafter the Lords of Trade), under Lord Halifax, sent a fleet of 13 military transports with a complement of troops and settlers to establish a colony under Colonel Edward Cornwallis, the provincial governor of Nova Scotia. From 1750 to 1752, the government recruited some 2,700 immigrants from the Protestant areas of France, Switzerland, and Germany plus an equal number of discharged soldiers and sailors to ensure a loyal population supporting Britain's interests against the French.¹¹¹

11. Money problems in Halifax; shortages and counterfeiting

Although Halifax was officially supported by parliamentary appropriations,¹¹² the expenses incurred in developing the city made it difficult to operate within the constraints of the prescribed allotment. Very early on, Governor Cornwallis exhausted his ready supply of coin to pay the garrison and was obliged to raise money by whatever means available; he even resorted to commandeering and purchase pieces-of-eight *reales* with bills of exchange from passing merchant vessels.¹¹³ The early history of Annapolis Royal was now destined to repeat itself; the bills of exchange written by Cornwallis on London were frequently refused and thus a line of available credit was denied by Boston and New York merchants.¹¹⁴ With the challenge of carving Halifax out of the wilderness, the governor was faced with the problem of finding sufficient capital to finance major construction projects.

By mid-1750, now that Massachusetts was freed from the shackles of public debt and on a firm financial footing with the recent infusion of Spanish milled dollars, hard money could be readily purchased from both New York and Boston using good bills of exchange.¹¹⁵ Cornwallis was successful in purchasing in Boston £4,000 in Spanish milled dollars at 54d., the sterling rate, in June 1750.¹¹⁶ This new wealth did not remain very long in the colony and hard money became

109 McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, p. 231.

110 McCusker and Mennard, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

111 The most comprehensive reference on the European immigration to Nova Scotia is by Winthrop P. Bell, *The Foreign Protestants and the Settlement of Nova Scotia* (Toronto 1961, repr. 1990).

112 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #314, #324. From 1749-56, Parliament granted £470,518 for the support of Halifax (Shortt, *op. cit.*, #479, #480) which by 1780 had grown to £690,000 (Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, p.127n).

113 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #335.

114 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #316, #332, #333, #334, #335, #345.

115 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #322, #325, #326, #333, #345.

116 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #321.

rapidly scarce. It was proposed that there were two immediate causes for the shortage of available specie in the Halifax market: the first was because of the sudden expanse of new housing,

... the Settlers wanted an incredible quantity of Lumber & Lime & Bricks &c. Household furniture of all kinds & fresh Provisions & had nothing to purchase them with but Dollars. The second and chief cause was the Loss of the Colonys Credit in March [1750]. While the Credit of the Governors Bills was good [i.e. prior to March 1750] there was no difficulty in procuring Dollars.¹¹⁷

As for the second reason, in November 1750, there were adequate quantities of silver which would have been available to Cornwallis in either Boston or New York. However, since the Nova Scotia bills of exchange were notorious for delay or non-payment, the Boston and New York merchants dared not trust them as history again repeated itself.

This above excerpt is from a seven-page document submitted by Nova Scotia's administration to the Lords of Trade on November 26, 1750, as an explanation and justification defending itself against London's allegation of financial mismanagement in Halifax.¹¹⁸ This section explains why the colony ran out of hard money so quickly and its defensive tone must be interpreted in the context of Halifax's response to higher authority. The passage was written several months after Massachusetts bills of credit had been retired from circulation in March 1750 – therefore Boston paper money was no longer an option to pay for imported purchases. The context also suggests that the "Settlers" who made these purchases did not have access to bills of exchange because of the colony's faltering credit rating since March. Therefore, at this time in the development of Halifax, the colonists' only recourse to buy the required imports was to ship hard money. Thus again, the inertia of the metropolitan government in settling outstanding bills of exchange in a timely fashion hampered the colonial governor's access to available credit in Boston and New York and his capacity to effect payment for the goods and services the colony required. With neither paper currency nor credit immediately available, the only option was to spend coined money which was rapidly exhausted.

Into September 1750, there was still insufficient hard money available in Halifax for the government "to discharge the debts due to the Artificers and Labourers who have been Employ'd in the King's Works"¹¹⁹ As a temporary measure to meet these obligations, the Governor's Council proposed the issuance of certificates, to be receivable by local merchants, which would circulate at par until such time as they could be redeemed in money. The merchants did not support this proposal which did not survive beyond the planning phase. Cornwallis even proposed to the Board of Trade the expedient of minting a base coin to supply the currency needs.¹²⁰ This suggestion was answered to the effect that, even though it was illegal, the Board opined that "... such Coin Would not remain in the Settlement but would find its Passage out of it for its real value in Payment to the Foreign Merchant." Perhaps as a consolation, the Board of Trade did make a counteroffer to send £6,000 in specie, mostly in Spanish dollars, for payment of the military and a "... great Part of the Sum in very small Coins, that it may better answer the Purposes of general Circulation."¹²¹ While this gesture was noble, a second communication four months later withdrew the offer since the Board of Trade, itself, lacked adequate funding, and so the chronic problem remained – no hard money! Cornwallis' only remaining option was to continue paying local

117 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #353 (p. 328).

118 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #331, #334, #335.

119 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #342.

120 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #356.

121 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #361.

accounts in small bills of exchange which had the inherent problem of being slower in redemption and more costly.

Due to the shortage of silver just described, the rate of the Spanish dollar in Halifax was advanced from 54d. to five shillings in September 1750. Finally, when money arrived from London and the continuing parliamentary subsidies guaranteed a firm basis to Nova Scotia's money of account, the five shilling par value of the Spanish milled dollar was set by law in 1758, becoming known as the "Halifax rating." This rate established the par value of the Nova Scotia money of account in terms of the Spanish milled dollar. To distinguish "Halifax money" from sterling, the suffix "cy," for currency, was appended.¹²² Although the Spanish milled dollar was never declared legal tender in Nova Scotia, it was accorded that *de facto* status from common usage.¹²³

Nova Scotia was now untethered from the Massachusetts finance standard with its new "Halifax rating" of £111.11, Halifax money of account, to £100 sterling, while Massachusetts, after the infusion of specie in 1749, returned to Proclamation money in 1750 at £133.33, Massachusetts money of account, to £100 sterling. In trade with New York, the commercial rate was £160:£100, New York on Halifax, both sums in their respective monies of account.¹²⁴ Despite this first independent action by the government of Halifax to regulate its own money, this rate was disallowed by London in 1762 because it failed to meet the provisions of the Proclamation of 1704, made law in 1707. This official prohibition notwithstanding, the "Halifax rating" remained in popular usage.¹²⁵

In November 1750, the captain of a sloop from New York was apprehended for importing some 3,000 whole and cut *pistareens* into the port of Halifax. His offense was that he sold the coins for "... much more than their Value thereof ..." at a price from 1s. 2d. to 1s. 4d., each for the whole coins, and secondly, that his cut coins were unevenly sectioned so as to pass for more than their true worth. The captain pleaded ignorance that he had committed a crime and argued that a profit was necessary if he were going to import the money from New York. His case was dismissed but the governor's council acted immediately and issued a proclamation prohibiting the further cutting of *pistareens* in the province and that any cut *pistareens* should pass only by weight at 6d. for a half *pistareen* "full measure," and 3d. for a quarter "full measure." The penalty for conviction would be the same as the laws of England for falsifying or defacing the current coin.¹²⁶ The rate for a full coin was established at 12d. with the half-cut and quarter-cut coins in proportion at 6d. and 3d.

Pistareens were debased two *reales* coins minted in mainland Spain, at .833 fine, which passed at ten *reales* to the Spanish milled dollar whereas those two *reales* coins from Spanish mints in the New World passed at eight *reales* to the milled dollar, hence the name, a piece-of-eight.¹²⁷ *Pistareens* were a very important trade coin in the New World since due their lower silver content, they were much less apt to be melted down and exported as bullion and tended to circulate as local

122 Ruth McQuade, "Halifax Currency in Nova Scotia," *The Canadian Numismatic Journal*, vol. 21 (Nov. 1976), p. 399.

123 Chalmers, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

124 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #438.

125 *A History of the Bank of Canada*; Shortt, *op. cit.*, document #342.

126 Shortt, *op. cit.* #348-50. Almost exactly two years later, the council elaborated on this measure and specified that cut *pistareens* should pass at 4s. 6d. per ounce (Shortt, *op. cit.*, #414, #415).

127 For a complete review of *pistareens*, see John Kleeberg, " 'A Coin Perfectly Familiar to Us All:' The Role of the *Pistareen*," *The Colonial Newsletter*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (December, 1998), pp. 1857-77; "The Four *Pistareens*," *ibid*, pp. 1879-86; Thomas A. Kays, "When Cross *Pistareens* Cut Their Way Through the Tobacco Colonies," *The Colonial Newsletter*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (April, 2001), pp. 2169-99; Mossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-61. In Shortt (*op. cit.*, p. 1n), the editor confused the Spanish-American two *reales* with the metropolitan Spanish *pistareen*, also denominated as two *reales* – new plate.

currency. For that reason, it is not at all surprising to find them everywhere in colonized North America, and in fact, many *pistareens* had recently been imported from England into Boston in 1749, for the settlement of Massachusetts' war debt, where their rate was set at 1s. 2½d., (Proc.) Massachusetts money of account. But now with the new Halifax rating of five shillings or 60d, to the Spanish milled dollar, *pistareens* would pass at five coins to the dollar, or at 12d. each, earning the nickname, "Halifax shilling" or "a fifth."¹²⁸ (By contrast, a Spanish-American two *reales* would be rated at four coins to the dollar – or 15d. each.) Thus the captain was overcharging from 2d. to 4d. per whole coins and obviously more on the "cheat" cuts, but nonetheless, the infusion of small money was welcomed since the governor's council made them legal for payments up to five shillings, i.e. five *pistareens*.

Valuable information can be gleaned about the hard money that actually circulated in Halifax from statements taken from contemporaneous legal proceedings against those who coined or passed fraudulent money. In these cases, everyday coins were described in a manner indicating that they were entirely familiar to the local citizens. Of the five persons charged for either counterfeiting, importing, or uttering (passing) false coins in 1753,¹²⁹ the first indictment was against Josiah Allen, a silversmith, and John Burnside, a carpenter, for possessing 14 coins "... of pewter, Tin and Lead, and other mixt Metals to the Likeness and resemblance of the good Lawfull and Current money and Silver Coin of Our Lord the King of this province..." By their description, these were probably cast counterfeits of actual coins. Specifically enumerated in Halifax money of account (Spanish milled dollar at 60d.) were the following counterfeit coins:

- 15d., a quarter dollar – a Spanish American two *reales*
- 12d., shilling or pistareen – one-fifth of a dollar
- 7½d., one-eighth of a dollar - one Spanish American *real*
- 6d., half-pistareen – one-tenth of a dollar

Allen was acquitted but Burnside was found guilty of passing (uttering) four of the false quarter-dollars and half-*pistareens* for which he spent one-half hour in the pillory. David Dodge, recently arrived from Massachusetts, imported two counterfeit "Gold Coins ... called Double Loons otherwise called four pistoles" for which offense he spent six months in "his Majesties Gaol." The coin was obviously a Spanish *doubloon* of eight *escudos* or four Spanish *pistoles*.

The final case in 1757 aroused considerable controversy. John Young was convicted of counterfeiting several Spanish dollars and Mr. Badcock of uttering counterfeit *pistareens* but the Grand Jury refused to return an indictment of high treason. On retrial, a new jury found them guilty of high treason, a crime, which, under English law, demanded the death penalty. The Chief Justice considered that punishment too severe and opined that the laws of England against "counterfeiting foreign Coin Current within this Realm" did not extend to Nova Scotia which is not part of England. The Lords of Trade agreed with his interpretation and further recommended that uttering counterfeit coins should only be a high misdemeanor. In his discussion of the case, the Chief Justice stated that an appropriate deterrent must be found since it was essential to put an end to counterfeiting lest "... the Current Silver Coin here might become as the Copper Coin is at present one half Counterfeit ..." ¹³⁰ The latter statement is an acknowledgement that counterfeit halfpence were also prevalent in Nova Scotia just as they were in the other colonies. Despite official recognition that bogus coppers imported from England circulated freely, no official action was taken until 1787 against those apprehended importing or possessing such counterfeits. Then the prescribed punishment amounted to a mere "slap on the wrist" when one judged guilty of such an

128 Willey, *op. cit.*, p. 284-85.

129 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #433.

130 Shortt, *op. cit.*, #483, #488.

offense was required only to pay a fine equal to twice the value of the false money. The Legislative Assembly took a much firmer stand against the alteration or counterfeiting within the silver medium when, in 1758, it set new penalties against “counterfeiting, washing, rounding, or scaling any foreign coins circulating in the colony or uttering such coins.” Convicted offenders were sentenced to stand in the pillory for one hour with their ear nailed to it and then suffer a public flogging and be obliged to pay costs.¹³¹

Counterfeit coins were certainly nothing new to the region and it is likely that many found their way to Halifax from New England. In 1751, Nathaniel Fales, a fugitive counterfeiter from Connecticut specializing in Spanish dollars, was said to have escaped to Halifax.¹³² A 1753 newspaper report from Boston related the indictment of Daniel Giddings, Jr., for counterfeiting Spanish milled dollars from mixed metals and “for uttering one of them knowing the same to be counterfeit... .” For that transgression he was whipped 15 lashes, stood in the pillory one hour, and was sentenced to hard labor for three months.¹³³ In Rhode Island, in the 1760s, there was a flood of bogus coins – *pistareens*, dollars, halfpence – against which the public was warned. Some counterfeit Spanish dollars were “so well finished as hardly to be distinguished from good ones by close inspection.”¹³⁴ Such money as this could very easily have turned up in Nova Scotia. In 1770, a local Haligonian, Christopher Moore, was convicted “of coining and uttering counterfeit [Spanish] dollars,” for which he was whipped and stood one hour in the pillory to which his ears were nailed.¹³⁵

12. Some new monetary initiatives

In 1751 a group of merchants suggested a unique way to increase the money supply by granting “bounties” to stimulate exports and local industry where subsidies would be awarded based on the amount of fish actually exported and for ships built locally. These bounties would be raised from duties and taxes on imported liquor and liquor licenses, another scheme that was hoped to encourage local breweries and distilleries. The following year a variety of agricultural products were added. These bounty certificates actually circulated as currency¹³⁶ – as will be discussed later.

The government at Halifax encountered significant logistical problems in providing for the influx of foreign immigrants who required victualling until they achieved self-sufficiency. The Board of Trade suggested that rather than importing the necessary quantity of food and provisions to support them, it might be easier to subsidize each settler and soldier with a *per diem* cash allotment of 3d., thus permitting individuals to provide for themselves on the open market. It was proposed that this scheme would be less expensive for the government and much more convenient for the participants. Also it would effect great economies by stimulating the market and stopping the illegal sale of government stores. For this plan to work, a large amount of small change would be required to make these daily purchases and accordingly a shipment of £4,562 10s. in dollars and halfpence was arranged. It was soon advised that it was unrealistic to assume that 3d. was a sufficient subsidy to support each soldier in the winter when supplies were tight. The “3d. plan” was found to be unworkable and, as the winter of 1752 approached, the governor was obliged to appropriate

131 R. C. Willey, “Counterfeiting in Colonial Canada,” *The Canadian Numismatic Journal*, Vol. 17, (Jan 1972), pp. 9-13, quotation on p. 11.

132 Kenneth Scott, *Counterfeiting in Colonial Connecticut*, ANS Notes and Monographs #140 (New York, 1957), p. 103.

133 *The Boston Evening-Post*, 29 Oct. 1753.

134 Kenneth Scott, *Counterfeiting in Colonial Rhode Island* (Providence, 1957), pp. 50-54.

135 *Nova Scotia Chronicle and Weekly Advertiser*, 20 March and 10 April, 1770.

136 Shortt, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxviii, xlix, #362, #363, #364, #371, #391, #392, #395, #455, #471, #487, #490, #491, #492.

the specified funds to buy provisions on the open market from Boston and New York. With this newfound luxury of having so many halfpence available in the small change medium, the governor's council was not certain as to what rate they should pass in terms of silver and solicited the advice of the merchants. The merchants' response was not recorded but the council noted that the halfpence could not be expected to remain in Nova Scotia for more than a year since they were quickly siphoned off into neighboring colonies by outside traders since the imports required to sustain the large population exceeded the exports of local products and thereby cash left the colony due to this chronic trade deficit. They further requested a yearly supply of £1,000 to maintain

... a Sufficient quantity of Change, a thing earnestly to be wished, as it will be a great relief to the Labourers, the Soldiery and all the Poorer Sort, who not only by the want of it will lye open to great impositions, but are likewise thereby encouraged to frequent unlicensed & disorderly Tippling Houses, in which alone they can pass their bad cut money because no fair Trader will take it.¹³⁷

In March 1753 the Tower Mint acted on a further request for halfpence by saying that because of the

... large Quantity of counterfeit Half pence having been lately passed about in Payments, the internal Trade of this Kingdom has been so much affected, and so many Complaints have been made from most of the Trading towns of this evil, that the Mint has been obliged to issue all they could make for the current Circulation, and to answer the demands in Trade for this Coin; so that it is impossible at present to comply with your proposal of sending over a Sum of Money in half pence; We have this however, as well as your proposal of sending over a Sum in Silver Specie, under Our Consideration; as soon as we come to a Resolution, shall acquaint you with it.¹³⁸

They did not have to wait too long since by November a shipment of £500 in halfpence (240,000) was dispatched.¹³⁹

Despite the Parliamentary support, the government still had to resort to creative measures to raise sufficient money for certain public projects. Lacking other funds, a lottery was held to finance the construction of a lighthouse at Cape Sambro at the entrance of Halifax harbor in 1752. Unfortunately, there were not always sufficient funds to maintain the lighthouse and keep it lit.¹⁴⁰ A method commonly employed for the colony's government to procure hard money for their local use was to sell, in Boston and New York, its bills of exchange drawn on London on their funds appropriated by Parliament.¹⁴¹

13. The "face off" at Chignecto; the French and Indian War

The southern boundary between Nova Scotia (old Acadia) and the Colony of Massachusetts Bay remained unsettled with the lands between the Kennebec River in central Maine and the St. Croix River, the present US-Canadian border – remaining in dispute. The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht was vague; the French ceded Acadia to its "present limits" which were never defined.¹⁴² The British government held that Nova Scotia also included what is now New Brunswick, the Gaspé Peninsula

¹³⁷ Shortt, *op. cit.*, #419.

¹³⁸ Shortt, *op. cit.*, #427. The last issue of George II halfpence was 1754.

¹³⁹ Shortt, *op. cit.*, #435.

¹⁴⁰ Shortt, *op. cit.*, #398; Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, pp. 238, 251.

¹⁴¹ Shortt, *op. cit.*, , #429, #448.

¹⁴² Personal communication, Peter N. Moogk, July 9, 2003.

of Québec, and eastern Maine to the Kennebec River¹⁴³ and had need to settle this new territory and extend her influence into the region since France still had armed footholds in her backyard both at Québec and Louisbourg. Contributing further to Britain's apprehension was the fact that the local Acadians not only remained a potential military threat but also actively supported Louisbourg both materially and politically. In the winter of 1749/50, the French forces from Québec assumed control of what is now New Brunswick and took possession of the narrow Isthmus of Chignecto (the present-day Nova Scotia-New Brunswick border) which formed a natural boundary between the conflicting English and French claims. To oppose further French infiltration, the English built Fort Lawrence in 1750 on the eastern bank of the Missaguash River. In reaction to this defensive maneuver, the French constructed Fort Beauséjour in 1751 just a short distance to the west of Fort Lawrence on the opposite side of the river. This purpose of this garrison was twofold: it was designed to prevent an English incursion into New Brunswick, which the French claimed as their territory, and secondly to keep the access routes open for the Acadians to supply Québec and Louisbourg with agricultural produce. To guard the northern end of this important trade route, the French constructed Fort Gaspereau 16 miles distant on the northern shore of the isthmus as further protection for Acadians to transport their goods across land to the Northumberland Strait and thence by water to either Québec or Louisbourg. Contrary to a treaty, the French constructed a fort at the mouth of the St. John River which the English considered their territory. The Acadian farmers in the region were in the unenviable position of being between a rock and a hard place as they were badgered by both superpowers – but nonetheless refused to swear an unqualified oath of allegiance to King George.¹⁴⁴

When war with France again broke out in 1754, it became abundantly clear to the British that they could no longer tolerate the presence of an unfriendly civilian population of French Roman Catholics within Nova Scotia. This chronic aggravation was finally resolved by the forced resettlement of 6,000 Acadians into the lower 13 colonies and Louisiana, although as many 3,000 to 4,000 escaped the deportation and fled into Canada or *Île St. Jean*.¹⁴⁵ In June 1755, Fort Beauséjour fell to a New England force who renamed it Fort Cumberland; two days later Fort Gaspereau surrendered without a contest which, under British rule, became known as Fort Monckton. Fort St. John, at the mouth of the St. John River, was destroyed by a naval expedition. Despite the defeat of the French and expulsion of the Acadians, guerrilla warfare was waged by the residual Acadians, who had eluded capture, in collaboration with their Indian allies. They continued to harass the British who now occupied a more strategic position at the newly won Fort Cumberland; since Fort Lawrence was no longer essential to local security, it was abandoned.¹⁴⁶

14. The final fall of Louisbourg; the end of the French Regime

There were a few influential visionaries in England who supported the American position that total control of Canada was essential for British supremacy in North America. Among them was William Pitt, the English Whig leader, who, as a highly esteemed friend of America, was commemorated by the contemporaneous 1766 Pitt medalet. When the fragile peace was again shattered by the Seven Years' War (1754-63),¹⁴⁷ Pitt, who had become prime minister in 1756, recognized the necessity of neutralizing Louisbourg before attempting an assault on Québec City. After several

¹⁴³ Bell, *op cit*, p. 16.

¹⁴⁴ Gladys Trenholm, Miep Norden, and Josephine Trenholm, *A History of Fort Lawrence* (N.P. 1985), pp. 38-45.

¹⁴⁵ These numbers are not precise but are from several sources (Moogk, *La Nouvelle France*, p. 8; Peter Landry, *History of Nova Scotia*, Book 2; part 6, chap 17; <http://www.blupete.com/Hist>, last accessed 20 September 2003. This web site is highly recommended.

¹⁴⁶ Trenholm *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-96.

¹⁴⁷ This conflict, known in the New World as The French and Indian War, erupted in the Ohio River valley as a local dispute which then spread to Europe.




Figure 8: This medalet, struck in 1766, honored Sir William Pitt in recognition of his role as a benefactor to the British North American colonies. Through his efforts the onerous “Stamp Tax” was repealed and in his long range planning, he recognized the strategic and economic importance of Louisbourg. [Shown actual size.] *Courtesy American Numismatic Society.*

setbacks, Pitt “softened up” Louisbourg with a naval blockade for two years before the fort was captured by a 157-ship armada and 14,000 troops in 1758. Thus by 1758, the French presence in Nova Scotia had been eliminated and so all of the former “Acadia” was indisputably under English control. “Once bitten, twice shy,” the English demolished the fort two years later for fear that the fortunes of war might again return it to French control as happened in 1748. In 1759, Québec City finally succumbed to a British siege, thus ending the French regime in North America,¹⁴⁸ an action confirmed by the Peace of Paris in 1763. At this same time, the western-most regions of old Acadia, which were to become the future New Brunswick, were undisputedly added to the colony of Nova Scotia. By these same negotiations, *Île St. Jean* was annexed to Nova Scotia where it remained until 1769 when it was established as a separate colony – later to be renamed Prince Edward Island.

15. British North America after 1763

The end of the French and Indian War brought many changes in the rapport between Great Britain and her North American Colonies. After 1763, Great Britain, now in undisputed control of the seas and shipping trade and sovereign over much of the North American continent, was faced with a huge war debt and naturally looked to the American colonies to help shoulder some of this liability. If supplementary taxes could not be imposed on colonial commerce, the only remaining tax base would be the property of the corrupt, arrogant, land-owning oligarchy who controlled Parliament which legislated to their own advantage at the expense of both the American and British commercial classes.¹⁴⁹ In the past, Parliament had passed a number of Navigation Acts, controlling external trade, which were never enforced in the belief that this enhanced freedom for colonial merchants would stimulate commerce to the ultimate benefit of the mother country. The colonists came to take this policy of “salutary neglect” for granted and for decades had been basking in the benefits of this *de facto* independence from metropolitan authority in their internal affairs. When Parliament, now in need of additional revenue, started to exert control over colonial life by enacting stern new legislation, the Americans perceived the new laws as restrictive to their individual freedoms and infringements on their rights as Englishmen, notwithstanding the fact that some of these measures were imposed throughout the British Empire. Among other things, these new parliamentary actions imposed new tariffs, restricted imports and exports, controlled currency and manufacturing, and regulated civil government. As a practical consideration, the postwar slowdown did increase the economic burden of the additional taxes.¹⁵⁰

The altered relationship was extremely complex in nature but briefly summarized, the British viewed the colonists as ungrateful subjects who refused to pay their fair share of the costs of maintaining the empire. The colonists – so accustomed to their autonomy – considered the new imposts unjust, that the standing British army now stationed in their midst threatened their

¹⁴⁸ The fishing islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon in the Gulf of St. Lawrence remained French.

¹⁴⁹ Carl van Doren, *Benjamin Franklin* (New York, 1938), pp. 329, 332, 361, 440-41, 486-87, 597.

¹⁵⁰ Christopher Moore, *The Loyalists – Revolution, Exile, Settlement*, revised 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1994), pp. 53, 86.

independence, and that the new restrictions and demands of Parliament were arbitrary and unfair. A natural consequence of these divergent viewpoints was the polarization of the colonial population according to their opinions and sympathies; some remained loyal to the king and Parliament, others espoused the colonial position, while the remainder were either noncommittal or disinterested. The Loyalists felt that continued ties to Great Britain as part of an Anglo-American empire were vital for American prosperity and progress while the opposition group – the so-called “patriots” – resisted any degree of metropolitan interference they viewed detrimental to their interests – both in individual liberties and economic freedom. By 1775, what had once started as a question of unfair taxation was rapidly evolving into an issue of inviolability of colonial charters and laws. Whereas the king and his ministers simply wanted the Americans to help support the Empire, they could not, or did not, understand the political sentiments of the colonists and lacked the prophetic wisdom to see where all this mob violence was heading; or as otherwise stated, “enlightened Englishmen were not in power.”¹⁵¹ The causes of the American Revolution were multifaceted and extend far beyond the scope of this paper but sufficient to say, “The debate over liberty was suddenly a war.”¹⁵² What started as a tax revolt against perceived metropolitan oppression had now become a civil war between opposing American factions.

The ranks of the Loyalists cut through all social classes from wealthy merchants to poor laborers, who had no concept of the pending ideological battle. Among those who learned that the tyranny of the patriots was worse than the abstract injustices of Parliament was William Franklin, the royal governor of New Jersey and illegitimate son of Benjamin, who was imprisoned in the infamous Simsbury Mines in Connecticut prior to his exile in England.¹⁵³ While some Loyalists, fearing for their safety, departed as early as 1775 for England or took sanctuary in Québec, Nova Scotia or the West Indies, the major exodus was not until 1783.

16. Money problems in Nova Scotia after 1763

After the fall of Canada and the end of the French and Indian War in 1763, the English forces withdrew from Halifax. With their departure, the prosperity and money which their presence had infused into the region greatly diminished from the time when it had been an overwhelmingly military town from 1749 to 1763. Now that hostilities had ceased, Britain’s government directed its attention to more serious problems elsewhere in the empire and the annual parliamentary grants that aided the emerging colony were substantially reduced to £5,400 between 1762 and 1782. The net effect of decreased government subsidies, the troop withdrawal, the end of the wartime land boom, the decreased immigration, and the shrinking urban population resulted in a post-war depression. Now the chief source of income was from tax and duty revenues.

The bounty system, initially instituted in 1751 to stimulate the development of local industry and resources, was designed to be self-supporting from the duties collected on imported rum and other alcohol-related imposts. Since the bounty system was a local initiative, the metropolitan treasury was reluctant to bail the colony out of any incurred deficit euphemistically referred to as their “exceedings.” When it first became apparent that the bounty payments had surpassed the tax revenues from the “rum duties,” the bounty payments were suspended in 1754. In 1757, when the fund accumulated a surplus, not only was the bounty system resumed, but many more enumerated items were added to the list including stipends for improving and fencing land, raising

¹⁵¹ Van Doren, *op. cit.*, pp. 441, 518, quotation p. 381.

¹⁵² Moore, *The Loyalists*, pp. 46-47, 49, 70-71, 124, and *passim*, quotation p. 60. “An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution,” by Marc Egnal and Joseph A. Ernst, discusses regional, social and economic factors and their role in the causation of the war (*William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series XXIX (1972), pp. 3-32.

¹⁵³ Moore, *The Loyalists*, pp. 14, 60, 108. Benjamin Franklin and his son, William, held diametrically opposite positions in regard to the War. After the hostilities there was some attempt at reconciliation but the former affection was never revived and William remained in England (Van Doren, *op. cit.* pp. 549, 718, 726).

wheat, barley, rye, turnips, hay, hemp, flax, and catching and curing fish. The program was further expanded to reward those who produced the first, second and third largest crops of hemp and grain. Tax receipts continued to lag far behind anticipated income, since, except for Halifax, many of the customs' agents in the other ports of entry turned their backs as illegal West Indian rum was smuggled into the numerous bays and inlets along the coast. Colonists welcomed contraband goods as evidenced by a 1755 jury who refused to convict three New England smugglers for murder who were caught red-handed and who, during the skirmish, wounded two and killed a third English sailor. A nine-months' sentence for manslaughter was deemed an adequate punishment by this jury of peers.¹⁵⁴

So much for the proposed funding of the bounty program whose average annual deficit cost the colony some £5,400 – money they did not have, yet they still continued to spend!¹⁵⁵ The entire bounty system was abolished in 1764, but, nevertheless, the government was responsible for the accumulated deficit which had encumbered the emerging colony with the sizable burden of £25,000 during the ten years from 1761 to 1771. This debt was so staggering in view of the stagnant economy, the province's administration wondered if it could ever be paid. Several requests to Parliament to issue paper money were flatly denied.¹⁵⁶ Such was the unpleasant fate of an economic stimulus package, which through mismanagement and over-expansion, had mutated from a promised "energizer" into a virtual "millstone" in a few short years.

So how did the colony manage? In an attempt to wring more money out of the colonists, more enumerated articles were added to the roster of dutiable items (loaf-sugar, tea, coffee, playing cards, bricks, boards, shingles and clapboards) – but whether these added imposts were collected or not remains another matter. Since coined money had practically disappeared, in some regions bookkeeping barter and simple barter filled the gap where no other currency was available. Basically there was a stagnation of trade: the merchants bought goods from their suppliers on credit on which they paid interest; the merchants, in turn, entrusted goods to farmers and fishermen, who, in the expectation of bounty payments, bought from the merchants on credit; bounty payments were suspended but on which interest was being paid by the province on the accumulated debt of £10,000; the result – no one had any credit. As a stopgap measure, the unredeemed bounty certificates were converted into debt certificates at 6% interest, called Provincial Notes. These debt warrants, denominated as £1, £5, and £10 notes, were essentially an investment instrument bought by private individuals and local merchants, accrued yearly interest, circulated like bank bills, were acceptable for debts, and were replaced when worn. "These transferable certificates like Bank Bills – will have a Considerable Effect on Trade – and Serve as a Medium and will not be carried out of the Province as specie is now."¹⁵⁷ In the final analysis, the merchants and wealthy citizenry of the colony were carrying the provincial debt.

The Bounty Act functioned on an "honor system" whereby a participant would swear under oath to a Justice of the Peace as to the amount of sanctioned crops or items he produced, a declaration that would be further corroborated by two "creditable" witnesses. Such an unverifiable reporting mechanism could be liable to exaggeration at best, or outright dishonesty at the worst. In 1773, when Governor Francis Legge was appointed to Nova Scotia, high on his agenda was to discover how the colony had achieved such an enormous debt in so brief a time. One of his major tasks was to conduct an audit of colonial finances where he found an aggregate of £11,308 13s. 10³/₄d.

¹⁵⁴ Brebner, *New England's Outpost*, p. 247.

¹⁵⁵ Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, pp. 101, 151, 164, 239, 258.

¹⁵⁶ Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, pp. 152, 232, 233, 274

¹⁵⁷ "Early Descriptions of Nova Scotia: State and Condition of the Province of Nova Scotia together with some observations &c 29th October 1763," *Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Annual Report for 1933*; pp.21-25; quote p. 22.




Figure 9: A five shilling debt certificate issued as a promissory note at 6% to the Reverend John Breynton by the Nova Scotia Provincial treasurer, Benjamin Green, with handwritten notations that eleven years of interest had been paid. The certificate was extended until July 1, 1789. [Shown reduced in size. Actual size is 6 1/2" X 3".] Courtesy Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management (RG 31-107, vol. 2. #2, Provincial Debt and Currency, 1763-1826).




Figure 10: A £5 debt certificate issued to Henry Newton by Benjamin Green on which eleven years of paid interest are recorded. This bill was also extended to July 12, 1789. [Shown reduced in size. Actual size is 8 3/8" X 5".] Courtesy Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management (RG 31-107, vol. 2. #2, Provincial Debt and Currency, 1763-1826).

in bookkeeping errors in favor of the government!¹⁵⁸ Several officials were incriminated but, most of all, the colony's accounting methods were found to be severely flawed. An allegation was made by the Assembly that fraud on the part of the Lunenburg farmers within the bounty program was the "principle (*sic*) cause" of the whole debt. While Bell acknowledged that perjury at Lunenburg under the bounty system was a disgrace, he came to the farmers' defense by stating that calculations of the colony's debt had excluded ambitious public works expenditures in Halifax. To blame the entire debt on these foreign immigrants was an irresponsible exaggeration and a politically motivated attempt to find a scapegoat for governmental irresponsibility and malfeasance.¹⁵⁹ The province's initial mistake after 1763 was to maintain its usual spending level and to rely on its accustomed wartime revenues to remain solvent. Fortunately for the Nova Scotians, the debt certificates were redeemed and the colony's indebtedness was substantially reduced in a few brief years as the local economy again flourished with the return of the British garrison troops and naval forces, and the influx of escaping Loyalists during the American Revolution. Not only was hard cash evident, it was now abundant! They were saved by the War!

17. Unrest in Nova Scotia; the American Revolution

After 1758, security for the more remote Nova Scotia communities could at last be guaranteed now that the French and Indian alliance was broken. The land became attractive to "pre-loyalist" settlers from New England, especially fishermen and their families from Marblehead, Nantucket, and Cape Cod communities who settled along the southern coastal regions which placed them 400 miles closer to the rich fishing grounds of the Grand Banks.¹⁶⁰ The Halifax merchants, many originally from the Boston area, were becoming quite influential. They demanded the traditional rights of Englishmen including an elected assembly which was granted in 1758. Between 1760 and 1763, some 4,500 "New England Planters" – encouraged by these civil guarantees, immigrated to Nova Scotia together with many Ulster Scots and many deported Acadians, who had begun to trickle back to the region¹⁶¹ but were prevented from re-establishing themselves on their former lands.¹⁶² The population was shifting away from Halifax into the hinterlands. In 1762, more New England immigrants settled in the St. John River Valley communities after the area was made safe by the destruction of the French fort at Saint John in 1755. As with any large migration, the movement was bi-directional; by 1773 some folks found the rigors of this new life too demanding and returned to the comfort of New England, but all in all, "the sturdy outnumbered the fainthearted." By 1775 the civilian population was 20,000 of whom two-thirds were Yankee Congregationalists¹⁶³ such that the region earned the name, "New New England."¹⁶⁴

On the brink of the American Revolution, Nova Scotia was under the same duress as its New England neighbors. It, too, rallied against the Stamp Act of 1765,¹⁶⁵ "taxation without representation," roving bands of Royal Navy pressgangs, and the other injustices imposed by an insensitive Parliament. A shipment of hay destined for General Gage's Boston cavalry mysteriously caught fire; some merchants refused to handle East India Company tea, although Brebner feels that the

¹⁵⁸ Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, p. 259.

¹⁵⁹ Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 552-69.

¹⁶⁰ Trenholm *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-108; Rawlyk, *op. cit.*, p. 221; Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, p. 55.

¹⁶¹ Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, pp. 102-8.

¹⁶² Personal communication, Peter N. Moogk, July 9, 2003.

¹⁶³ These would have been descendants of the Puritans.

¹⁶⁴ Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, pp. 117, 155-56 (quotation on p.156), chap 7; *The Canadian Encyclopedia* (Edmonton, 1998), vol II, p.1283.

¹⁶⁵ One notable player in this resistance was Isaiah Thomas, the future publisher of the famous newspaper, *The Massachusetts Spy* (Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, pp. 157-63).

opposition in Nova Scotia to the tea tax has been exaggerated.¹⁶⁶ Although there were divergent loyalties among the population – these transplanted New Englanders in the outer settlements wished to remain neutral and made it clear they would not bear arms in any “fratricidal strife” against their kinfolk unless invaded. Parallels have been drawn between the neutrality of these Yankees and the Acadians where both groups were caught between the crossfire of two belligerents.¹⁶⁷ It is also to be remembered that Nova Scotia, and Halifax in particular, had been established and maintained by the British military whereas the New England colonies had been founded and supported by individual initiative and thus their passion for independence and self-determination burned brighter. Thus any intrusion on individual liberties – either actual or perceived – would elicit a far greater reaction in native New Englanders than would be expected from their more subservient, transplanted Nova Scotian kinfolk who had become used to domination under an autocratic military regime.¹⁶⁸ “Nova Scotia simply did not have anywhere near the right mix of motivated people who would think it worthwhile to go through the blood and toil of a revolution.”¹⁶⁹ The general sympathy remained pro-British, due in a large part to the powerful influence of the Halifax merchants who profited handsomely from commissary contracts supplying the army and Royal Navy and the lucrative West Indian trade. No class of citizens was heavily mortgaged to London and thus there were none who could hope to benefit from a war in which their foreign debt would be repudiated after a victorious overthrow of the British administration. When General Howe evacuated Boston on March 17, 1776, his forces were temporarily billeted in Halifax until redeployed to New York City in June. Halifax had become a springboard for British military and naval operations.

Prior to the Revolution, Samuel Adams encouraged the possession of Nova Scotia and Canada for the protection of the fisheries, the maintenance of future peace in the region, and the elimination of “corrupt British influence,”¹⁷⁰ while George Washington actively courted Canada to join the war effort against George III.¹⁷¹ Four Nova Scotia delegates attended the Second Continental Congress where they carried a petition signed by 600 supporters. The dissenters were encouraged and offered assistance by the Continental Army, help which never materialized. Rawlyk suggests that this lack of military support from the lower 13 colonies was due to their flagging interest in Nova Scotia since 1745, especially on the part of Massachusetts. This indifference was coupled with a reluctance of the colonial forces to engage the British forces on yet another front which they would have had to access through overland wilderness due to the superiority of the Royal Navy which could control sea routes.¹⁷²

Nonetheless, small bands of armed, disorganized, discontented New Englanders were active in the Chignecto area. One of these American sympathizers, Jonathan Eddy, attempted to take Fort Cumberland with a small ragtag band in November 1776 but, due to a lack of adequate support and artillery, he failed as did other armed incursions against Royalists in the St. John River Valley.¹⁷³ Thus by the end of 1776, all but New York, Pennsylvania and Georgia were firmly in the hands of the revolutionaries and to the north, both Nova Scotia and Canada (future Québec),

¹⁶⁶ *Neutral Yankees*, p.170.

¹⁶⁷ Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, p. 309-11.

¹⁶⁸ Nova Scotia in the pre-Revolutionary period is discussed in detail by Rawlyk, *op. cit.*, Chapter 12.

¹⁶⁹ Landry, *op. cit.*, book 2; part 2; chapter14, Conclusion.

¹⁷⁰ Justin H. Smith, *Our Struggle for the 14th Colony: Canada and the American Revolution* (NY, 1907) vol 1, p. 8; Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, p. 320.

¹⁷¹ George Washington circulated a broadside, written both in English and French, encouraging Canadian participation (George Ochoa, *The Fall of Quebec* [NJ, 1990], p. 56).

¹⁷² Rawlyk, *op. cit.*, pp. xvi, 240-51; personal communication, Peter N. Moogk, July 9, 2003.

¹⁷³ Trenholm et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 111-22; Thomas Raddall, *His Majesties' Yankees* (New York, 1942 – rep.1996) is an historically accurate, well written novel based on this campaign.

remained loyal. The British command at Halifax could easily have led an armed strike to the Kennebec River to make that the future southern boundary of Nova Scotia rather than the St. Croix River. There was even a proposal to establish that occupied area within the District of Maine – to be called New Ireland – a buffer zone between the two countries and a refuge for displaced Loyalists. The idea was dropped and instead, Nova Scotia was selected as a new home for the American Tories.¹⁷⁴ The only other hostile action to take place on Nova Scotia soil were raids by American privateers on Lunenburg, Annapolis Royal, and other south shore communities motivated more for the desire for booty than for the sake of any altruistic revolutionary ideology. On the other hand, an active bi-directional contraband trade continued between the southern ports of the Nova Scotian peninsula and New England to the mutual benefit of both regions; “those who engaged in it [smuggling] had to be on constant watch against the warders of both sides and, when caught, had to rely on their wits, on a choice of credentials, and on the tolerance or stupidity of their captors.”¹⁷⁵

In 1779, Congress recognized the importance of Canada to the future security and commerce of the United States and in the negotiations of Treaty of Paris in 1783, Benjamin Franklin suggested that Great Britain cede Canada and Nova Scotia to the United States.¹⁷⁶ The delegates were so tired of war and desirous of a quick termination to hostilities, they did not press their demand for the cession of the territory.¹⁷⁷ The treaty did not make adequate provision for the many American Loyalists who emigrated from the United States in 1783-84 seeking refuge in a friendly country to the north, after their safety could no longer be assured by the remnants of the British army who had departed for home.¹⁷⁸ Of this number, many settled in the future Ontario (Upper Canada), while some 35,000 came to Nova Scotia of whom 14,000 United Empire Loyalists settled in the St. John River Valley, an area which was soon partitioned from Nova Scotia becoming the Province of New Brunswick by royal decree in June 1784, a split prompted by conflict between ranking displaced Loyalists and the Halifax government.¹⁷⁹ “In 1783 victory had unleashed a paroxysm of triumphant violence against loyalist” but fortunately the tyranny of the majority was short-lived such that many Loyalists returned to the United States as early as 1784, with an estimated 10% leaving New Brunswick.¹⁸⁰

18. To summarize

Now we return to the original premise that Nova Scotia is the 14th Colony of mainland British North America. When Nova Scotia – except for *Île Royale* – reverted to Great Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, it already had its first appointed governor and was operating within the sphere of influence of Massachusetts. This was a few years earlier than Georgia, which held its royal charter from 1732 to 1752, and is traditionally given the honor of being number 13 in the list of colonies.¹⁸¹ Certainly after 1749, with the settlement of Halifax, and 1758, when Nova Scotia was granted an elective assembly, it was a distinct mainland colony, in which case it was the

174 Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, pp. 326, 329.

175 Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, pp. 330-31.

176 Van Doren, *op. cit.*, pp. 670, 681.

177 Smith, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 569. The French government wanted Canada to remain under British rule as a threat to the United States so as to bind the Americans to a French alliance (personal communication, Peter N. Moogk, July 9, 2003; see also Van Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 670).

178 It was argued that the United States government did not owe the Loyalists any war reparation for seized property since this value was far offset by the damage done to American property by the English (Van Doren, *op. cit.*, p. 678-79, 691).

179 Moore, *The Loyalists*, pp. 149, 169-70.

180 Moore, *The Loyalists*, pp. 248, 250, quotation p. 248.

181 Alan Taylor, *American Colonies* (NY, 2001), p. 241. One could argue the moot point whether Nova Scotia and Georgia should swap places in the British North American colonial hierarchy.

fourteenth. Within the span of 72 years, from 1711 to 1783, Nova Scotia had passed from a complete dependency of the Massachusetts Bay Colony to a satellite of Great Britain upon whom it would now look for future guidance. When the remainder of northern New France was ceded to English control in 1763, the Province of Québec was created and this territory can be considered the last British North American colony.¹⁸²

Date	Event	Situation
1604	Port Royal founded by Sieur de Monts	
1608	Québec founded by Sieur de Monts	
1613	Port Royal burned by force from Virginia	attempt to dislodge French from "English" claim
1621	Alexander's claim to Acadia	region first called Nova Scotia
1627-28	Alexander took Acadia and Québec	
1632	Both regions returned to France	terms of Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye
1654	Acadia taken by New England force	
1667	Acadia returned to France	terms of Treaty of Breda
1673	Acadia briefly held by Dutch	immediately returned by Treaty of Westminster
1690	Acadia taken by New Englanders	King William's War 1689-97
1691	Acadia annexed to Massachusetts	written into 2 nd Massachusetts Bay charter
1697	Acadia returned to French	terms of Peace of Ryswick
1710	Port Royal taken by New Englanders; renamed Annapolis Royal; province becomes Nova Scotia	Queen Anne's War 1702-13 ; permanent control by Peace of Utrecht 1713 ; French retain <i>Île Royale</i> (Cape Breton) & <i>Île St. Jean</i> (P.E.I.)
1713	Construction of Louisbourg begins	project significantly underway by 1720
1745	Louisbourg taken by English	King George's War 1744-48
1748	Louisbourg returned to French	provisions of Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle
1749	Founding of Halifax	separation from Massachusetts
1749	French take control of "New Brunswick"	still a part of Acadia
1750	English build Fort Lawrence	to protect from further French incursion
1751	French build Fort Beauséjour	in opposition; to protect Acadian supply route
1751	French build Fort Gaspereaux	ditto
1755	Acadians expelled to lower 13 colonies	French and Indian War 1754-63
1755	Forts Gaspereaux and Beauséjour fall	
1758	Louisbourg falls for the final time	French leave Canada by Peace of Paris 1763
1760	Fort at Louisbourg demolished	
1763-69	Prince Edward Island part of Nova Scotia	in 1769 became separate colony
1776	Yankee attempt to take Fort Cumberland	other brief skirmishes along NB/NS border
1783	Loyalist migration from 13 colonies	13 colonies independent by Treaty of Paris 1783
1784	New Brunswick established	

Table 3: Summary of Important Events in Nova Scotia History.

¹⁸² This order of precedence has not considered Hudson's Bay Company or Newfoundland.

Money of Nova Scotia from Archæological Evidence

There are three aspects to this study of Nova Scotia currency: the first is to review the documentary paper trail which has just been completed, the next is to study the actual coins themselves as historical artifacts, while the third is to incorporate both the written and physical evidence into a meaningful whole. While the archival data come from surviving records of the period, the study of the coins themselves comes from the examination of the actual examples recovered from controlled excavations at archæological sites where the coins can be related to known historical events. Since most of the coins excavated from these locations were low denominations within the small change medium, it can be presumed that they were victims of accidental and random loss during the daily lives of their former owners. Only valuable coins would have been buried purposely for safekeeping. Within the scope of examining coins from historical sites, there is a newer, more modern but less precise method whereby coins are recovered by metal detectors. Unfortunately with this last method, there is no capacity to determine the time or the circumstances of the loss and many assumptions must be made. We shall find in the following pages of this paper that much of Nova Scotia's circulating coinage was similar in composition to that of the lower 13 British North American colonies, except that here, due to active trade with *Île Royale*, the money of New France has a definite place in its history.

The archæological sites in Nova Scotia, including sea salvage, from which coins have been recovered and reported have included the fortress at Louisbourg, the wreck of *Le Chameau*, already discussed, Fort Beauséjour, later renamed Fort Cumberland, and Fort Gaspereau. Although some of these finds were predominantly French coinages, they were still located geographically in Nova Scotia and this money would have circulated elsewhere within the province – a fact substantiated by the prior documentary evidence.

Except for *Le Chameau* and a possible cache of silver hidden at Fort Beauséjour, the vast majority of coins recovered through controlled excavation and metal detection efforts were usually small change coins, the victims of accidental loss. Minor coins were more common, often smaller in size, and their loss may not have been deemed sufficiently tragic for their former owners to have mounted an extensive search. Coins of greater value were less commonly found because they are frequently larger in size and, when discovered missing, their anxious owners would have hunted extensively or until they were found. Thus, it is extremely unusual to find a lost gold coin that had not been purposely concealed for safekeeping. Bearing these factors in mind, it does not follow that the census of coins recovered from accidental losses is indicative of their proportional representation within their contemporaneous circulating population. One would expect proportionately more lower denominational pieces – except where a hoard of valuable money was intentionally hidden and never reclaimed by its owners. Thus, finding one eight *reales* and forty-five one *real* cobs at a site (as we shall see later at Fort Beauséjour) does not necessarily mean that a piece-of-eight is 45 times rarer than a one *real*.

1. Coins from Louisbourg

Île Royale was not a permanent part of Nova Scotia until after 1758, but prior to that time there was extensive trade between Louisbourg and the Acadian French in the Annapolis Valley. We have already seen documentation that French *écus aux huit L* and gold – likely the *mirlitons* – were the prevalent specie coins in the Annapolis Royal region in 1727. If those large coins penetrated Nova Scotian commerce, it is a reasonable assumption that fractional French silver, copper and billon coins were also present in the small currency medium even though no specific varieties were identified in the preceding documents except for “French pennies” or *sous*. However, much is known about the circulating currency within Louisbourg which functioned from 1713 until 1758 when it was decommissioned by the English and actually demolished two years later. Artifacts

from the site at Louisbourg were carefully examined by archæologists when the fort was significantly restored in the 1960s.¹⁸³ During that operation, many coins were recovered which have been personally inventoried by Peter Moogk who reported on 770 specimens as itemized in Table 4.¹⁸⁴ He concurs that the money from Louisbourg would have ended up in the Annapolis region since the “Acadians from British Nova Scotia insisted on cash payments for the foodstuffs they delivered to Louisbourg ...”¹⁸⁵

This extensive census of French coins comes as no surprise; of the five *écus* found, two were *écus aux huit L*, the same type of coin that drew attention to the governor’s council in Annapolis Royal in 1727 and the same as those recovered from *Le Chameau* sunk in 1725. (From collateral information within probated wills, Moogk was also able to identify other varieties of *écus* present in Louisbourg [Ciani 2117 and 2122].)

Because of the extensive trade that passed through Louisbourg from New England, New York, Philadelphia, the West Indies, and even Nova Scotia, one would expect a wide variety of Spanish silver coins. Here we find eight of the thirteen Spanish two *reales* were *pistareens* from Spanish metropolitan mints; these issues were the workhorse of the fractional Spanish silver medium which circulated throughout the world and could have arrived there from any number of locations in the western hemisphere. Many *pistareens* were introduced into the northern colonies from the 1749 shipment on the *Mermaid* received in Boston. *Pistareens* – both whole and cut segments – were known in Halifax as documented in the court records previously discussed.

The ubiquitous English halfpence found in Louisbourg, mostly of George II, could have come from several sources, the most obvious being from accidental loss by military personnel during the first English occupation from 1745 to 1748 and again from 1758 to 1760. Considering the large number recovered, there are other possibilities. We have just read that, starting in 1752, many halfpence were imported into Halifax from England to replenish the small change pool but the same documents also complained that most of the coppers left the region about as quickly as they arrived; Louisbourg could have been one of those many destinations of the halfpence that drained out of Halifax through normal trade relations. Also, considering Louisbourg’s proximity to Massachusetts, there is a great chance that any 1749-dated coppers could have come from the Bay Colony since about 23% of the Tower Mint’s total halfpenny production for that year arrived in Boston in the company of Spanish specie and *pistareens* as reimbursement for the colony’s war debt.¹⁸⁶ There is no indication how many of the 172 halfpence from Louisbourg were counterfeit except to note that authorities in Halifax in 1757 estimated that one-half of circulating coppers were false, a percentage that is quoted from many areas in British North America. Whether counterfeit or regal it made no practical difference to persons in the marketplace since both species of copper passed equally well in commerce “without discrimination.” Since small change was so scarce and in such great demand, anything with reasonable resemblance to a halfpenny would be acceptable. Because the regal copper halfpenny was actually a token, it passed for an amount greater than the combined value of its intrinsic metal content plus the minting cost. By accepting coppers

183 A detailed account of this restoration is included in *Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archæology and History* #2 (Ottawa, 1971).

184 Moogk, “When Money Talks,” pp. 55-75; Peter N. Moogk, “A Pocketful of Change at Louisbourg,” *Canadian Numismatic Journal* (March, 1976), Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 97-103; personal communication, February 9, 2003.

185 Moogk, “When Money Talks,” p. 60.

186 The total count was 801,376 halfpence and 424,032 farthings - mostly 1749 but some dated 1750. See Mossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-22, for a summary of counterfeit and regal coppers in the colonies.

#	Coins	Comments
362	French coppers & bronze	
3	<i>Double tournois</i> of 2 deniers	from Henri IV to Louis XIII
298	<i>Liards</i> of 3 deniers	80% dated from the 1650s
2	Half-sols of 1720s	6 deniers
5	Sols, 1719-21	12 deniers
5	<i>Colonies Françaises</i> 1721-22	9 deniers
6	miscellaneous	
43	<i>Dardennes</i> , 1710-12	6 deniers
173	French billon	
25	<i>Douzains</i>	16 th and 17 th centuries
88	Sols of 15 deniers, 1692-1713	¾ from 1692-1705 series
12	"Mousquetaries" of 30 deniers, 1709-13	
5	Sols, 1738-64 series	12 deniers
40	<i>Double sols</i> , 1738-64 series	24 deniers
3	miscellaneous	
18	French Silver	
2	1/20 <i>écu</i>	
4	1/10 <i>écu</i>	
1	¼ <i>écu</i>	
6	½ <i>écu</i>	
5	<i>écu</i>	2 <i>écu aux 8 L</i> (Ciani 2112), 1655 (Ciani 1849)
3	Spanish Coppers	
3	various <i>Maravedis</i>	
30	Spanish Silver	
2	½ <i>real</i> cob	
5	1 <i>real</i> cob	
2	1 <i>real</i> milled	
2	2 <i>reales</i> cob	
5	2 <i>reales</i> milled	
8	2 <i>reales</i> , (pistareens), 1717-45	8 from Spanish mints, therefore pistareens
1	4 <i>reales</i> cob	
3	8 <i>reales</i> milled	
2	miscellaneous	
177	English Coppers	
9	Farthings	
168	Halfpence	60% from 1740s
7	Miscellaneous	(includes a Rosa Americana 2d.)
1	English silver 6d.	
6	Unclassified; excludes counters, etc.	from Burgundy, Portugal, Ireland, Netherlands

Table 4: Coins (770) Recovered from Louisbourg 1713-58.

"without discrimination," it inferred that one token was as good as another and the coin's provenance was an unimportant concern.¹⁸⁷

As for French coppers found at Louisbourg, Moogk reported the preponderance were *liards* (three *deniers*¹⁸⁸) of which 80% were from the 1650s. From the chronological age of the coppers he further observed that "As a rule, the colonists made do with old worn coins from the reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715) for their small change." Consistent with the fact that the garrison was a naval installation, many "*Dardennes*" of six *deniers* were recovered which Moogk explains were bronze necessity money struck from metal salvaged from old cannons at French naval arsenals during a financial crisis in 1710-13.¹⁸⁹

Contrary to some preconceived expectations of numismatists, only five nine *deniers* French Colonies pieces of 1721-22, minted specifically for colonial use, were found. This issue was unpopular with the colonists because it was over-rated to pass at nine deniers while coins of the same weight, the bronze *dardennes* and the copper half-*sou* passed at six deniers.¹⁹⁰

Billon coins, well rooted in antiquity, had a long history in metropolitan France. Some issues, associated with the French regime in the New World, were found in significant numbers in Louisbourg. These minor issues were struck from an alloy composed largely of copper but with sufficient silver¹⁹¹ to give the illusion of precious metal and thus more desirable than coppers. In instances when a copper planchet was only washed with silver, the base copper became apparent when the silver veneer wore away.¹⁹²

Four distinct generations of billon coins circulated in the French regime¹⁹³ and it is entirely reasonable to assume, based on documentary evidence, such pieces were also used by the Nova Scotia Acadians. As we have previously discussed, French coinage was subject to a number of revaluations over the years. In May 1636, the quarter *écu* was increased from 15 to 20 *sols* thus raising the full *écu* from 60 to 80 *sols*. In a move to make the fractional coins proportionally equivalent, they too were increased in value by a royal decree of June 1640 whereby the old billon *douzains* of twelve *deniers* were increased to fifteen.¹⁹⁴ In this instance, the *denier* refers to a unit

187 This is a fair statement for the 1750s except for the few colonies where these counterfeit coppers accumulated beyond the immediate requirements of the small change medium. Certainly by the late 1780s, the excess of counterfeit coppers became a major issue in Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania as exemplified in the "Coppers Panic of 1789" (see Mossman, *op. cit.*, Chapter 8).

188 The *denier* was the basic monetary unit, originally silver but then copper as the *denier tournois* under Henry III (1574-89). Three *deniers* made one *liard*. The French monetary system was a duodecimal coinage with 12 *deniers* to the *sou* (*sol*) and 20 *sous* to the *livre* – similar to the English system of 12 d. to the shilling and 20 shillings to the pound. The *liard* was equivalent to the English farthing and the *sou* to an English penny. Both the "d" for the English penny and the *denier* are derived from the same Latin root, *denarius*, originally a small silver coin (O'Neill, *op. cit.*).

189 Moogk, "Louisbourg," p. 98

190 Moogk, "When Money Talks," p. 60.

191 Prior to 1641, the alloy was 24% silver but during the reign of Louis XIV it reduced to 19.95% (Moogk, "When Money Talks," p. 59). Some of the provincial French mints used a lower percentage of silver than Paris (Robert A. Vlack, *An Illustrated Catalogue of The French Billon Coinage in the Americas* [in press]).

192 The classic example of this is the billon English groat of Henry VIII, which, when the silver wash wore thin on his full-face portrait, the underlying base copper over his nose was revealed, earning for him the enduring nickname, "Old Coppernose."

193 Hodder, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 17, 18, 22, 25-27; Vlack, *op. cit.*, *passim*; R. C. Willey, "The Numismatics of the French Regime Re-Examined, Part II, The Sol Marqué," *The Canadian Numismatic Journal*, Vol. 15 (1970), pp. 147-49.

194 The internet site, "*Edits, arrêts, ordonnances monétaires de l'autorité royale et des cours souveraines de Hugues Capet à Louis XVI*," <http://www.ordonnances.org/>, contains 7,600 references to royal edicts and decrees pertaining to the coinages of France from Hugh Capet to Louis XVI. Last accessed May 30, 2003.

of money of account in which the value of this actual coined money was computed. The edict almost apologetically continues that "... this is their just value in proportion to the said quarter-écus ...".¹⁹⁵ As an indication of this revaluation, the *douzains* were to be marked on one side by "*une petite Fleur-de-lis ...*." Of the added three deniers in value, two were to revert to the king and the remaining one to the person who delivered the coins to the mint for readjustment with a counterstamp. Any coins not so marked within two months of the edict were to be confiscated to the king. These *douzains* were so named from the French *douze* (twelve) based on their value of twelve *deniers* as one *sou*.¹⁹⁶ Many of these old, marked *douzains* found in Louisbourg, were well worn hammered coins dating from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and still showed the 1640 *fleur-de-lis* counterstamp (Ciani 1709). Some of these counterstamped coins were *douzain*-sized billon coins from other countries which found their way to the mint. The fact that these coins were thus *marked* gave rise to their common name *sou* (or *sol*) *marqué* or in the plural *sous* (or *sols*) *marqués*. It was really a contradiction in terms to speak of a *sou* of 15 *deniers* when, by definition, a *sou* was a 12 *deniers* coin. Of course, this oxymoron was a result of the successive reshuffling of the coins' legislated value as expressed in *deniers* as a money of account, a frequent occurrence both in the mother country and during the French regime in Canada which has been tabulated by Moogk.¹⁹⁷

The old *douzains*, counterstamped in 1640, were reduced from 15 to 12 *deniers* in accordance with the Declaration of March 28, 1679. The devaluation of these worn coins caused some problems within the small change medium as expressed in the preamble to the Edict of October 1692 where it stated that this decrease in value encouraged the shipment of the heavier coins out of the kingdom which were replaced by lightweight coins and counterfeits, or "*sols defectueux*." The profiteering from dealing in defective coins, called *billonnage*, was a rampant, but strictly forbidden practice. The small change medium had become so infused with defective coins - lightweight, foreign, worn, counterfeit and otherwise - a shortage of coins for daily commerce resulted.¹⁹⁸ To rectify this dearth of billon coins, the Edict of October 1692 ordered another recoinage which had two aspects: the old worn royal *douzains* - even those already counterstamped in 1640 - were to be restruck with newly prepared dies of Louis XIV (Ciani 1980); and, if this measure did not produce enough coins for current use, then an additional six million *livres* worth of coins was authorized to be struck on fresh planchets (Ciani 1979). Most of the French mints participated in this recoinage which lasted throughout the series from 1692 to 1705.¹⁹⁹

Another recoinage and revaluation was ordered by the Edict of May 1709 in an effort to make the value of billon coins more proportional with that of gold and silver in order to curb the continued illegal profiteering in coinage, or *billonnage*. This resulted in the third type of billon coinage that circulated in the French Regime in Canada. As part of this plan, the old *douzains* were increased in value from 15 to 18 *deniers*, effective in all French territories, except in Alsace where they were to pass at 20 deniers. This increased valuation was followed by a second edict in September 1709 which authorized a new and heavier billon coinage of 30 *deniers* to be minted only at the Lyon and Metz mints. These new issues were to be of the same alloy as previous billon coinages, but because of their new increased weight, they were to pass at 30 *deniers* everywhere in France, except for 33 *deniers* in Alsace. These new *sols marqués* were nicknamed *mousquetaires*

195 "*Nous avons reconnu n'y avoir autre meilleur moyen que d'augmenter le prix desdits Douzains à quinze deniers, qui est leur iuste valeur à proportion de celle desdits quarts d'escus ...*."

196 This has the same origin as the English word "dozen." As a coin, *douzains* - or earlier *dozains* (1480) - were first minted in the reign of Louis XI (Ciani 759). Accordingly, a coin of six *deniers* was called a *sizain* or *sixain*.

197 Moogk, "When Money Talks," p. 64. There is no way to know if the rate schedules for the *sous marqués* published for New France were honored by the Acadians when they spent these billon pieces in Nova Scotia proper.

198 "... *ce qui cause la disette de ces menuës monoyes dans le commerce journalier des menuës Denrées ...*"

199 Vlack, *op. cit.*

because of the *deux L adossés* on the obverse resembling the emblem on the tunic of a royal musketeer (Ciani 1984). This series became the first billon coinage specifically struck for use in the French Colonies in America but only those from the Lyon mint were authorized to circulate overseas, a permission which did not include the companion 15 *deniers demi-mousquetaire* (Ciani 1986) of the series minted only at Metz for use in France.²⁰⁰ Moogk states that very few of these half *mousquetaires* were found in Louisbourg, obviously having arrived there in people's pockets and not via officially sanctioned channels.²⁰¹

The fourth issue were the 24 *deniers* pieces of 1738-64 which were actually *double sols* (*sous*) (Ciani 2138) and commonly known as "*sous marqués*." Several *sols* or *sous* of 12 *deniers* (Ciani 2140) within this same series were also recovered at Louisbourg attesting to a circulation in New France and, by extension, in Nova Scotia. This new emission came about because the United Provinces of the Netherlands in 1738 reduced the value of their billon coinages by one-half and the French government was fearful that this devalued money would flow into France where it would be worth more. To protect the small change medium, the importation and circulation of this foreign money was prohibited and to further avert a potential exploitation of the higher value of billon coinages in France, Louis XIV ordered that effective immediately the old *douzains* as well as the 30 *deniers "mousquetaires"* would be devalued by one-quarter from 24 to 18 *deniers* while the "*demi-pieces de trente deniers*" (half-*mousquetaires*) would be re-tariffed at nine. A subsequent Edict of October 1738 deemed it necessary to retire the *sols* of 30 *deniers* from circulation and replace them with new *sols* and *demi-sols* of the same standard to be valued at 24 and 12 *sols*, respectively, in accord with their intrinsic metal content plus the cost of the reminting and conversion.²⁰²

2. Coins recovered from the Chignecto area forts

Coins have been recovered from two other controlled archaeological excavations, namely Fort Beauséjour, renamed Fort Cumberland, and Fort Gaspereau, later Fort Monckton. Both sites are located on the Chignecto Isthmus and, as with Louisbourg, both forts shared a French and later an English connection.

The 81 coins recovered at Fort Beauséjour/Cumberland are listed in Table 5.²⁰³ As previously detailed, this fort operated under the French from 1751 to 1755, and then under British occupation from 1755 to 1761. It was reactivated during the American Revolution from 1776 until 1783. Only two identifiable French coins were found, both billon pieces not unlike those listed by Moogk from Louisbourg. The English and Irish coppers extend into a later period than Louisbourg with about a third of them George III issues. The 1775 halfpenny (Cunningham fig. 7) appears to be counterfeit. The other specimens are not illustrated. Contemporaneous newspaper accounts in the 1780s suggested that at least 95% of George III halfpence circulating in the lower colonies were counterfeit and from a practical position, about all recovered from controlled sites are bogus.²⁰⁴ It is also a coinage where the date has no relationship to the actual year of manufacture since the production of 1775 counterfeits continued well into the next decade accounting for the preponderance of 1775-dated forgeries which were exported from Birmingham in great numbers.

200 Hodder, *op cit.*, pp. 18, 25-26.

201 "Louisbourg," p. 98.

202 See also, W. A. Shaw, *The History of Currency 1252 to 1894* (London, 1896) 2nd ed. (reprint, n.d. New York), pp 170-71.

203 Doug Shand, "The Coins of Fort Beauséjour," *The Atlantic Numismatist*, vol 35, No. 2 (April/May/June 1999), pp. 21-33; Ann Cunningham, "Coins From Fort Beauséjour, N.B." National Historic Sites Service, *Manuscript Report #24* (June, 1971).

204 *Federal Gazette* (Philadelphia), vol. 2, #106 (August 1, 1789). All George III halfpence recovered at Colonial Williamsburg were counterfeit as were all 73 recovered in the Stepney, CT, hoard.

#	Coins	Comments
2	French Billon	
1	<i>Douzain</i> (12 <i>deniers</i>) of Louis XIII, c/s <i>fleur-de-lis</i> in 1640	counterstamp raised value from 12 to 15 <i>denier</i> . Ciani 1709. (C. fig 1)
1	<i>Sou</i> of 15 <i>deniers</i> , 1692-1705	Ciani 1979
23	English Coppers	
9	George II ½d. young head, 1729-39	(C. fig 5)
8	George II ½d. old head, 1746-54	1748, 1752, ?1749, ?1753 (C. fig 3)
1	George III ¼d., 1773	(C. fig 8)
4	George III ½d.	others very worn and not pictured
1	1775 George III ½d. – counterfeit	(C. fig. 7)
4	Irish Coppers	
3	George II ½d., 1747	
1	George III ½d.	(C. fig 6)
51	Spanish Silver	
1	cob ½ <i>real</i> , 1745	
45	cob 1 <i>real</i> , from Lima or Potosí mints	Pillars of Hercules (C. figs 13, 14)
1	cob 8 <i>reales</i> , Potosí mint	(C. fig. 15)
1	cob 1 <i>real</i> , Mexico mint	Spanish coat of arms (C. fig. 17)
3	<i>Pistareens</i> of 2 <i>reales</i> , 1721, 23, 27	data reported from Shand, <i>op. cit.</i> , pp. 24, 27.
1	Confederation Copper	
1	Massachusetts cent 178?	(C. fig. 12)

Table 5: Coins (81) Recovered from Fort Beauséjour (Note: “C. fig” refers to the illustration in the Cunningham reference.)

There was a large accumulation, 48 in total, of Spanish cobs ranging in all denominations from a half-*real* to eight *reales* but with 45 examples of one *real* pieces, about half of which were dated in the 1740s. Many of the cobs and the three *pistareens* from mainland Spain were found together suggesting an emergency hoard hidden for safety when the fort was under siege rather than from casual accidental loss. The English coppers doubtless date from the British occupation, but the scattered Spanish silver could have been from either side. Of great interest was the recovery of a single Massachusetts cent (1787-88) which postdates the 1783-84 period of maximum Loyalist migration and probably arrived during later trade relations.

#	Coins
1	French Coppers
1	<i>Liard</i> de France, Rouen mint
2	French Billon
1	1711 “ <i>Mousquetaire</i> ” of 30 <i>deniers</i> , ? Lyon mint
1	1738 <i>double sol</i> , Pau mint
4	English Coppers
4	George II ½d., 2 –1749, 2 –1752
1	Miscellaneous
1	Nürnberg <i>pfennig</i> , 1714-77

Table 6: Coins (8) recovered at Fort Gaspereau.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ Barbara J. Wade, “Study of the Metal Artifacts From Fort Gaspereau,” *Manuscript Report 440* (Parks Canada 1975); Doug Shand, “The Coins of Fort Gaspereau,” *The Atlantic Numismatist*, vol. 36, no. 2, (April/May/June, 2000), pp. 25-31.

As a postscript to this recovery of 48 Spanish silver coins, it is noteworthy to report that over 200 Spanish coins, which apparently had been buried in a bag, were recovered from a construction site in Halifax County in 1959.²⁰⁶ This cache consisted of milled dollars, four *reales* and two *reales* coins minted in Mexico City, Lima, and Potosí. Since they dated from between 1752 and 1794, burial occurred at a time beyond the scope of this paper but are included as an example of a treasure hoard and not accidental loss.

Fort Gaspereau, later Fort Monckton, had a much shorter history; it was under the French in the 1751-55 period and spent only one year as home of a British garrison before it was abandoned in 1756. Eight coins were recovered here as indicated in Table 6 of which three were French. The *liard*, minted in Rouen, was too worn to identify the monarch but based on the Louisbourg sample, it was probably from the 1650s. The 30 *deniers* piece was a *mousquetaire* from the 1709-13 period while the other billon coin was a *double sol* of 24 *deniers* minted in Pau in 1738. Of the English halfpence, two were from 1749 which could have been from the *Mermaid* shipment already described. Since any world coin could have been drafted into service in any currency-starved area, it was not surprising to find the Nürnberg *pfennig* from 1714-77. It is anyone's guess how it arrived there except to say that none of the German settlers who landed in Halifax from 1749 to 1752 were known to be from that area.²⁰⁷

Recoveries with Metal Detectors from Local Sites

Metal detectors have become a valuable adjunct for locating artifacts – anywhere from recovering car keys lost at the beach to coins or other metallic objects from abandoned cellar holes at ancient settlements. While the recovery of such articles is indeed exciting, any historical information must be interpreted with caution since one cannot tell if a recovered coin was once a pocket piece lost during a rowdy football game played over an old house site, or whether some Spanish milled dollar was deposited in the earth after an unfortunate homestead burned in 1782. It is implausible that old coins were deliberately scattered over the ground. This is what is meant as an uncontrolled site in distinction to a systematic archaeological dig where the discovery of coins can be correlated with the recovery of other contemporaneous items from a known location. Such controlled environments are well described in the references just cited detailing the archaeological examination of Louisbourg and the other forts. Nonetheless, coins recovered by metal detectionists remain a very important source of information in determining the coins of the period. If a certain old coin – known to have circulated in the area – frequently turns up, the chances are overwhelming that it is a genuine historical artifact of the period rather than some recently lost item. The coin's condition, the depth at which it was found and other items in its immediate vicinity are important considerations and thus all clues need to be interpreted with a deductive approach. One has to maintain a careful perspective, consider all the evidence and be ever mindful that "one swallow does not make a summer."

1. Coins from the Chignecto Isthmus

This is an area first settled by the Acadians and later the English after 1760. It has been confirmed that the Acadians used French money earned from their Louisbourg trade and so it is expected that any coin found at Louisbourg might also be present here. Although I can find no formal census of all the coins located in one famous settlement, I did view three coins on public display at Grand Pré which follow the expected pattern: one billon *sol de 15 deniers*, a French *liard* of 169?, and a 1749 English halfpenny. After the Anglophones arrived, English coins, especially coppers, would be expected whereas any Spanish silver could have been used by either nation. This

206 Edward Morris, "The Upper Sackville Hoard," *The Canadian Numismatic Journal*, vol. 5 (1960), p. 229.

207 Bell, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

See Appendix III starting on page 2590 for examples of recovered coins from the 14th Colony.

#	Coins
12	Spanish Silver
	1738 Philip V, ? mint, ½ <i>pistareen</i> (1 <i>real</i>)
2	1717 Philip V, Madrid mint, <i>pistareen</i> (2 <i>reales</i>)
	1731 Philip V, <i>pistareen</i> (2 <i>reales</i>)
	1746 Philip V, ? mint, 1 <i>real</i> , assayer R
	1751 two <i>reales</i>
2	1771 one <i>real</i>
	1788 Charles III, Mexico City mint, 8 <i>reales</i> , assayer FM
	cob one <i>real</i>
2	cob one-half <i>reales</i>
1	Spanish copper
	Charles IV, 8 <i>maravedis</i>
3	French Silver
	1722Q Louis XV, Perpignan mint, 1/3 <i>écu</i> ; Ciani 2110
	1726K Louis XV, Bordeaux mint, 1/5 <i>écu</i> ; Ciani 2119
	1732T Louis XV, Nantes mint, 1/20 <i>écu</i> ; Ciani 2121
2	French Billon
	1709 Louis XIV, 30 <i>deniers</i> "mousquetaire"; Ciani 1984
	1738 Louis XV, <i>double sol</i> of 24 <i>deniers</i> Ciani 2138
14+	French Bronze/Copper
2	1711 "dardenne" of 6 <i>deniers</i> ; H and N mints Ciani 2019
4	Louis XIV <i>liards</i> ; 16?? D, 1697, 1703, 1708
1	1721 H <i>Colonies Françaises</i> , 9 <i>deniers</i> ; Ciani 2152
7+	<i>liards</i> of France
52+	English Coppers
1	George I ½d.
36+	George II ½d.
1	1752 George II ½d. - old head
1	George III farthing
12+	George III ½d.
1	George III ½d. – counterfeit
4	Irish Coppers
4	1723 George I ½d. – Wood's Hibernia
1	Confederation Copper
1	New Jersey copper - basal state
1	Miscellaneous
1	Rosa Americana 2d. (From P.E.I.)

Table 7: Coins recovered in the Chignecto Isthmus. *Courtesy of Karen Burris, Jamie Burris and Len Collette and Chris Costain.*

prediction is confirmed by the coins that have been found in the Chignecto region by metal detectionists as noted in Table 7.

The French, Spanish, and English George II coins in the above list are similar to those from Louisbourg in Table 4. The major difference is that the coins randomly lost and later recovered in the Chignecto Isthmus also include issues after 1758, such as the George III coppers, minted several years after Louisbourg was abandoned. Among these latter coppers, some are well enough preserved to be identified as counterfeits.

Four examples of William Wood's Hibernia coppers of 1722-24 were located here, a coinage which has been the subject of much recent research.²⁰⁸ These coppers were imported into the colonies beginning in 1737 and have been uncovered throughout the eastern seaboard²⁰⁹ and now their presence has been confirmed in the Maritimes. These coins could have come directly from Ireland or via New England among the belongings of early settlers. No matter their provenance, they would have been welcomed in this coin-starved area. The Rosa Americana twopence was actually recovered in Prince Edward Island which, for seven years, was part of Nova Scotia. This coinage, intended for the colonies, was also minted by private patent by William Wood. Since its value was dramatically overrated in terms of intrinsic metal content, it was very unpopular and saw a limited circulation although other examples have been unearthed over a widespread area, including Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Louisbourg.²¹⁰ A single Confederation copper from New Jersey made an appearance but many more will be described subsequently.

2. Coins from the St. John River Valley [as per map]

During the early history of the region, now within New Brunswick, there were French trading posts and a fort at Saint John. After the fall of French Canada in 1762, New Englanders came to Saint John and by the next year had established settlements up the St. John River Valley. In 1783 there was an influx of 14,000 United Empire Loyalists into the area, who within a year had demanded and obtained their autonomy from Nova Scotia. Hence we could expect English coppers and Spanish American silver to predominate in any coin finds which is indeed the case as enumerated in Table 8.

Leading this census are George II and George III halfpence, including the ever-present counterfeits probably the former property of Loyalist exiles. There are two French *sous* dated later than the French regime; they probably came from the lower colonies since such coppers have been found there, no doubt due to the French presence during the Revolution.²¹¹ These *sous*, or French pennies, are of a later date than those previously mentioned in the estate inventory conducted in Annapolis Royal in 1743/44. The presence of Spanish silver again confirms its role as an international coinage and the kingpin of domestic and foreign trade. Many of these pieces are dated after the colonial period under discussion and are included for interest. The big surprise is that there are no *pistareens*. The holed silver coins may have been pierced by the native populations or others to facilitate stringing for those with unreliable seams to their pockets.

208 Brian J. Danforth, "Wood's Hibernia Coins Come to America," *The Colonial Newsletter* (August, 2001), pp. 2213-30; Danforth, "Wood's Money: Acceptance or Rejection in Ireland," *The C4 Newsletter* vol. 8, no. 3 (Fall 2000), pp. 17-36.

209 Philip L. Mossman, "The Circulation of Irish Coinage in Pre-Federal America," *The Colonial Newsletter* (April, 1999), pp. 1899-1917.

210 R.C. Willey, "British and Foreign Coins Used in the Colonies," *The Canadian Numismatic Journal*, vol. 5, (1960), pp. 282-82; Moogk, "Louisbourg," p. 102.

211 Louis XV and XVI *sous* appear as host coins overstruck by New Jersey coppers (Mossman, *op. cit.*, p. 271).

#	Coins
12	English Coppers
	1721 George I halfpenny looks good
3	George II ½d. – basal state
	George II ½d. [1729-39 rat on leg]
	1742 English ½d.
	1744 George II ½d.– regal
	1770 George III ½d.- regal
	1772 English ½d. – probable counterfeit
	1773 George III ½d. - counterfeit
2	1775 George III ½d. – counterfeit
4	Irish Coppers
	1769 Irish ? counterfeit
	1781 George III ½d. counterfeit; E in REX backwards
	178[?] George III ½d.
	1783 George III ½d. counterfeit
2	French Coppers
2	Louis XVI <i>sou</i> ; 1791 Paris mint, 1780 La Rochelle mint
7	Spanish Silver
	1749 Mexico City mint, Ferdinand VI, one <i>real</i>
	1750 Mexico City mint, Ferdinand VI, one <i>real</i>
	1779 Mexico City mint, Charles III, Assayer FF, 2 <i>reales</i> , holed
	1782 Mexico City mint, 2 <i>reales</i>
	1793 Lima mint, 2 <i>reales</i>
	1806 Mexico City mint, Charles IV, Assayer TH, 8 <i>reales</i>
	1810 Mexico City mint, Ferdinand VII, Assayer HI, 8 <i>reales</i> , holed
15	Confederation Coppers
	1785 Connecticut copper; M. 3.1-L
4	1786 Connecticut coppers, ? M. 5.2-H1, ? M. 5.11-R, M. 29.2-o
5	1787 Connecticut coppers, ? M. 33.29-gg.1, 13-D, 33.19 var.
	1788 Connecticut copper, M. 17-Q
	1788 Vermont RR-20
	1786 New Jersey 14-J
	1787 New Jersey 63-S
	1787 Massachusetts cent
2	Miscellaneous
	1793 Bermuda penny
	Wood 33; Atkins 273
6	Evasives
	Atkins 284, 275, 204, 323, D&H Dublin 83, George Calvert token

Table 8: Coins (48) Recovered from St. John River Valley Settlements. *Courtesy of Tim Allen and Bazil Nash.*

There were 15 state coppers, primarily from Connecticut, dated from 1785 to 1787. Although out of the time period of this study, they are included because of their connection with the adjacent colonies. Since the major Loyalist migration occurred in the 1783-84 period, these recovered coppers were either the property of some stragglers but more likely the result of continued trade with the independent states to the south. Again – this is something we can never know and perhaps both explanations apply.

There are several evasive coppers of a later era (1790s to early 1800s) that were pressed into service to supplement the small change medium which for many years was inadequate to meet the requirements of daily commerce. Within this number is a Wood 33 (Atkins 273) copper which is a token of unknown provenance and date, found in large numbers in Northern New England and Upper New York State.²¹² The Bermuda penny located in New Brunswick serves as a reminder of the trade relations between these colonies.

More Counterfeiting

There were many accounts during the pre-Federal period of counterfeiting. We have already encountered some of these in early Halifax and New England. Because of its universal acceptance, the Spanish milled dollar was a very popular coin to imitate. These were primarily made by a casting technique – i.e. pouring melted base metal into moulds pressed from legitimate coins. Striking counterfeits from dies was another method but this required much more complicated equipment to roll planchets and sink dies. There is the story told of a Mr. Wheeler who was one of a gang of four who turned out bogus Mexican dollars from an installation in Maine overlooking the St. Croix River in the 1780s. This was the border between USA-New Brunswick. One of the party, a Mr. Ball, shot and killed a law officer, a crime for which he was apprehended and hanged. Wheeler, and his other two accomplices, Gates and Woodbury, had their ears cropped, a typical punishment, and told to leave Maine and never return. Gates made tracks toward the Annapolis Valley where he subsequently committed suicide. Woodbury's fate and whereabouts were unknown but Wheeler and his wife took refuge on Grand Manan, a Canadian island off the coast of Maine, arriving there in 1785.²¹³ He had all his forging equipment with him and continued making false dollars – but had no opportunity to utter them. Local legend maintains that he starved to death.²¹⁴

Summary

In any analysis of mainland British North America, it is misleading to consider only those colonies which formed the nucleus of the present day United States as the entire British North American empire. Not only is this the case for the 14th Colony, but for other British possessions in the New World. All Americans learn about Jamestown but few have heard of the Somers Islands, which were also a part of the Virginia Company. These islands were, for a period of eight years, more populated and more important than Jamestown whom they helped rescue from starvation and certain extinction. As a corollary, one can neither examine the history of the 14th Colony, Nova Scotia, without understanding its prior relationship with the other colonies. This concept is particularly apparent when studying the political history, economy, and circulating currency of Nova Scotia as we trace the colony's metamorphosis as it matured from a complete dependency

212 The unusual aspect of this token is that it was struck from wretchedly prepared dies onto well made planchets of relatively consistent weight of about 94 grains.

213 In 1772, Stephen Gates of Chatham, CT, was indicted for counterfeiting and passing Spanish dollars and Portuguese half-joes. The next year a Mr. Wheeler was arrested and acquitted for passing counterfeit New York bills in Connecticut. It is unknown whether either of those experienced counterfeiters were the same individuals involved here. Scott, *Counterfeiting in Colonial Connecticut*, pp. 200, 203.

214 *The Saint John Telegraph Journal*, June 22, 1949.

of Massachusetts into a province in its own right. Situated as both a political and geographic buffer between British and French influences, Nova Scotia participated in both economies – a fact evident from the currency that circulated within its relatively ill-defined and contested borders.

From documentary evidence, Massachusetts bills of credit, bills of exchange, *ad hoc* paymaster promissory notes and Provincial Notes served as paper currency. Coins from the French regime: silver *écus* and gold *pistoles*, and copper *sous* are specifically cited in official correspondence while other generic French coins are mentioned. Spanish silver, in particular the *pistareen*, was documented in early Halifax as were English halfpence. The archaeological findings from Louisbourg and other forts correlate well with recent recoveries by metal detection indicating that both French and English coins of the period circulated among the civilian population. Everywhere, the presence of Spanish silver confirmed its unchallenged position as the chief medium in international commerce.

Epilogue

I believe that within any composition traces of the author's prejudices, interests, preoccupations, style, personality, etc. are bound to rub off. This is certainly true in this essay which has been in the planning phase for many years. I became acutely aware that in my 1993 publication I did not do justice to the history of the 14th Colony and I hope this current work will compensate for that.


Numismatic interests aside, there is a significant personal involvement with this subject since my original Mossman ancestors arrived in Halifax, September 13, 1750, on the ship *Ann*, the second civilian transport to the new settlement. Over the next two years, 26 other great (x4) grandparents immigrated with their families to Nova Scotia, eventually settling on land grants in Lunenburg County with the other "foreign Protestants." While researching material for this paper, I kept wondering how my family was involved in all these currency rules and regulations of their adopted country and just what coins might have passed between their fingers. When I researched my genealogy, I learned that the early settlers were expected to reimburse the government for any unpaid balance of passage by working off the debt at the rate of 1s. a day. For David Mosimann, traveling from the Switzerland, that liability would have amounted to £14 18s. 11½d., sterling, or £16 11s. 2½d., "Halifax money." At the exchange of £111.11, Halifax money, to £100.00, sterling, such a sum would have required 331.2 days of toil. In today's money, David would have owed about £1,509.06, sterling, or \$2459.77, U.S.²¹⁵ This debt was never collected since he died in a devastating epidemic either before, or immediately upon, arrival. Another great (x4) grandfather, Josef Löw, of Mahone Bay, met up with a piece of bad luck when he was killed by a band of marauding Indians in 1758, one month after the fall of Louisbourg during the final days of the French and Indian War.

The remainder of my Nova Scotia roots are numbered among the New England Planters or "pre-loyalist" settlers. My great (x4) grandmother, Abigail Crosby, who relocated from Connecticut to Yarmouth, N.S., in 1760 with her mother and step-father, was a member of the same clan that claimed Sylvester Sage Crosby, a person that needs no further introduction to colonial numismatists.²¹⁶ Abigail's father-in-law, Matthew Pennell, another pre-loyalist Yankee ancestor, was appointed keeper of the Sambro lighthouse in 1772, that structure, about which we just read, whose construction was financed by popular lottery 20 years previously. Not to be outdone, it was my wife's great (x7) grandfather, Thomas Oakes, who, in 1691, was sent to England as an agent entrusted to negotiate and deliver the second charter to Boston, the same instrument that united Nova Scotia with the Massachusetts Bay Colony. In an August 10, 1703 Indian raid into the District

215 John J. McCusker, *How Much Is This In Real Money* (Worcester, MA, 2001) *passim*.

216 The relationship is pretty distant at 6th cousin, three generations removed!

of Maine, during Queen Anne's War, my wife's great (x6) grandfather Dominicus Jordan and his siblings were kidnapped, as children, and carried off to Canada where he remained in captivity at *Trois Rivières* for 13 years.

Whoever said history is dead? The people about whom we read are not the product of some modern author's imagination. I've shown history to be alive and well, particularly when one can trace a personal stake in it – not only from a genealogical perspective but also when history quickens and makes real the coins in our collections which played a role in the life and times of our ancestors. I hope you enjoy reading this paper as much as I enjoyed writing it. 

Acknowledgments

Several individuals and organizations assisted me in the preparation of this manuscript and I would like to acknowledge their contributions to this effort.

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I would also like to thank Peter N. Moogk who read the manuscript and corrected my deviations from historical accuracy. He is Professor of History, University of British Columbia, and has published several books on Canadian history, including two on the French regime, *Building a House in New France* (1977), and *La Nouvelle France* (2000). Professor Moogk's numismatic contributions include the identification and inventory of the coins recovered at Louisbourg. He also shared with me photographs of coins from his private collection.

Eric Newman, the leading authority on colonial paper money, needs no further introduction to numismatists. Not only did he read the manuscript and make helpful suggestions, but also, through The Eric P. Newman Numismatic Education Society, he generously provided photographs of paper currency and copies of exchange tables.


I would also thank *The Colonial Newsletter* staff – Gary Trudgen, Louis Jordan, Leslie Elam and Michael Hodder for their critical review of the manuscript.

Additional thanks: to Jamie Burris for the loan *A History of Fort Lawrence*, a valuable resource of regional history: to Darryl Atchison of County Cork Ireland for use of the *Canadian Numismatic Bibliography* to locate pertinent references and for sending me specific reprints: to Francis Campbell, librarian at the American Numismatic Society for providing me with copies of references: to Philip L. Hartling, Research Archivist, Rosemary V. Barbour, Archivist, and Lois York, Manager, Nova Scotia Archives for illustrations of Provincial Debt Certificates: to Dr. Terrance Punch for material on Nova Scotia bounties: to my cousin, Professor David J. Mossman for obtaining hard-to-find Parks Canada publications: to The Grand Manan museum, Charlotte County (NB) Archives, *St. Croix Courier* (St. Stephen, NB), and *Quoddy Tides* (Eastport, ME) for access to information on local counterfeiters.

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Appendix I: Map



Map of the Atlantic Provinces: Points of interest have been identified on the map with numbers. They are: 1. Connecticut River; 2. Kennebec River; 3. Penobscot River; 4. St. Croix River - present border between Maine and New Brunswick; 5. St. John River; 6. Grand Manan Island; 7. Port Royal - Annapolis Royal after 1711; 8. La Have; 9. Lunenburg; 10. Yarmouth; 11. Canso; 12. Trois Rivières; 13. Île Royale [Cape Breton Island]; 14. Île St. Louis [Prince Edward Island]; 15. Fort Gaspereaux [later Fort Monckton] - northern side of Chignecto Isthmus; 16. Fort Lawrence and Fort Beausejour [later Fort Cumberland] - southern side of Chignecto Isthmus; 17. Disputed territory between New Hampshire - later Vermont; 18. Mount Desert Island and Castine, Maine.

Appendix II: Bills of exchange

This appendix describes in greater detail the usage of bills of exchange since little space is devoted to this subject within the general numismatic literature. I am indebted to Professor McCusker for his guidance in the complexities of this subject. His book, *Money and Exchange*,²¹⁷ illustrates several bills of this period with an explanation of their function. Bills of exchange are also discussed in his chapter on paper money appearing in *Studies on Money in Early America*.²¹⁸

Bills of exchange, monetary instruments to transfer funds from one party to another, were in common use since the fourteenth century. They were originally invented as a safe method for merchants of one country to remit money to another country. The rules and regulations governing how they functioned were determined by custom and local laws. These bills played an important role in colonial Nova Scotia as related in this paper.

By definition, a bill of exchange is a written order whereby the owner of the money requests that the person or agency, who holds his money, pay a specified amount in favor of a third person. It is a legal contract. This transaction usually involves three or four people, but every new endorsement created a new party. As a transferable bill passed onto new endorsers, it could essentially enjoy a limited circulation as currency. There are two sorts of bills: a bill drawn on a person residing in a foreign country is a foreign bill, while one drawn on a person living in the same country is an inland or domestic bill. The laws of the country in which a bill was drawn prevailed as to the validity of the contract.

To start an example of a foreign bill: a merchant in Halifax has been exporting dried codfish to London for years and has chosen to have the proceeds from his sales deposited with his agent in London. He could have had his credit balance returned in hard money if he wanted to risk it to the perils of the sea. Now this Halifax merchant wishes to buy some English goods from a third party and have them shipped to Nova Scotia. The Haligonian merchant has three alternatives to purchase his desired imports: [1] he can ask for credit from his potential supplier; [2] he can ship hard money – if he has sufficient funds and dares to risk it to the perils of the North Atlantic. He could also insure his hard money but that adds to the cost. [3] Instead, the Haligonian is going to transfer some of his own credit balance held by his London agent to the supplier from whom he wants to purchase his goods.

The Halifax merchant thereby draws up a bill of exchange for the exact amount owed to his supplier and thus becomes the **drawer** of the bill in this business triangle. The London supplier in whose favor the bill is made becomes the **payee**. The **drawer's** agent or associate in London, who holds his funds against which the bill is written, is the **drawee**. When the bill of exchange arrives in London, the supplier, **payee**, takes the bill to the **drawee** who examines it, and upon determining that it is genuine and that the Halifax merchant has sufficient funds on deposit with him to cover the transaction, the **drawee** accepts the bill for payment. The **drawee** by this acknowledgment then becomes the **acceptor** and writes "accepted" on the face of the bill. The accepted bill is now ready for payment to the supplier [**payee**] according to the terms of the bills. Usually it is 30 or 60 days "after sight" meaning that in either a one or two months' span, the **drawee** must pay the **payee** the designated amount from the **drawer's** deposited funds and thus the Haligonian's [**drawer's**] debt is settled with his London supplier [**drawee**].

²¹⁷ *op. cit.*

²¹⁸ Eric P. Newman, editor, and Richard G. Doty, associate editor (New York, 1976), pp. 100-103. Other material for this section is Joseph Blunt, *The Shipmaster's Assistant and Commercial Digest* (New York, 1837), 2nd ed., pp. 345-55.

Now commonly a fourth party is added. This is another merchant in Annapolis Royal who does not have any financial credits held in London and, wishing to make some purchases of English merchandise, needs to find another merchant with sterling credits from whom he can purchase a bill of exchange to pay for his desired imports. He can look to Halifax or most likely Boston. In this case, the second merchant is the fourth party in the transaction who becomes the **payer** [or **buyer**] of the bill from **drawer** – who now becomes the **seller** of the bill. Here the **payer** buys the bill from the **drawer**, using funds denominated in Massachusetts money of account, by paying a fee according to the current exchange rate between Boston and London. The **payer** is actually buying some of the **drawer's** [**seller's**] foreign credits. The price paid by the **payer** to the **seller** will be determined by current cost of buying credit, governed by the present trade balance between the two sides of the Atlantic, with an element of interest involved since it is essentially a loan.

Now the actual bill of exchange could be a hand-written order for payment or it could be completed on a commercially available printed form with the particulars of the proposed transaction specifically stating the specific period for redemption after presentation to, and acceptance by, the **drawee**. This was stated as so many “days sight” – usually 60. As previously described, all bills were written as an original with two or three duplicates to ensure against loss. Only the first one presented was paid thus accounting for the availability for collectors of surviving “second or third of exchange” bills.

The **payee** has two options now that his bill has been accepted – he can wait the agreed 60 days or if the **payee** wants his money sooner than the 60 days' sight, he may take it to a banker [middleman – now a fifth player enters the scene] who will in turn buy the accepted bill from him, paying so much on the pound for the accepted bill. This is the **discounted bill**. The amount of the discount will be about the same as interest on the same amount of money for that specified period. Then at 60 days, the new owner of the bill will collect the full amount from the **drawee**. As the years progressed, it was the custom for all payees to go to a banker and get their money immediately on an accepted bill – and hence they would buy a “discounted” bill. The sense of the word “discounted” has changed over the years and means nothing like it does today.

Public bills – a bill drawn on the government – will accept the bill as valid – very rarely will they be refused – but the government may take its own sweet time about paying it. One can't sue the king! This delay in payment creates a significant cash flow problem for the **payer**, **drawer**, and **payee**. So if the **payee** goes to sell his accepted public bill to a middleman, he will have to take a greater discount since the middleman knows that it will be ages before he himself can collect – but he has confidence that the bill is negotiable eventually because it has been accepted. Therefore, he will pay the **payee** less for it – or it has been substantially discounted.

A private bill is drawn on a private individual or merchant.

A protested bill is one which the **drawee** refuses to honor for a variety of reasons. It may be counterfeit – the **seller** [**drawer**] may not have sufficient credit balance with the **drawee**, the **drawer** may already owe the **drawee** a large sum etc. Then the **payee** will take the protested bill to a notary and together they go to the **drawee** who lists the reasons for the nonpayment. This “**protest**” becomes a notarized legal document. The **drawee** then returns the protested bill and the protest to the **buyer** [or **drawer**]. The **buyer** goes back to the **seller**, **drawer**, to get his money back. The **seller** has to refund the sum paid to the **buyer**, plus interest on the money and a penalty which may be up to 20% - an amount determined by local law or custom. There is a six years' statute of limitation for suing for collection of protested bills.

Appendix III: Coins of the period including recovered examples

This 1717 Spanish cross pistareen of Philip V was recovered near an Acadian settlement in the Chignecto region. The name is derived from the obverse four quadrant shield with the two castles representing Castile and the pair of lions of Leon. Note the off-centered reverse, a common occurrence in coins of this series, which was due to the fact they were frequently minted with misaligned roller dies. Coins such as this are found all over British North America where they circulated widely. *Courtesy of Jamie Burris.*



One of several 1723 Wood's Hibernia halfpence from the Chignecto region. After 1737 these Irish coppers, minted under a private patent, were imported into the British North American colonies when they were effectively demonetized in Ireland following the issuance of heavier regal coppers of George II. The Wood's pieces are found throughout the colonies. *Courtesy of Jamie Burris.*



This 1787 Massachusetts copper is from a St. John River Valley community. Since it is dated later than the Loyalist exodus in 1783, it suggests this coin participated in commerce with New England or else was the lost property of a later arrival. *Courtesy of Tim Allen*



A 1656 *liard* of Louis XIV [Limoges mint] (Ciani 2012). The archaeological recoveries from Louisbourg confirm that this series was the most common minor coin in circulation. *Courtesy of Peter Moogk.*



These are two minor French silver coins from the Chignecto Isthmus in former Acadian country. On the left is a 1732 T [Nantes] Louis XV silver 1/20th *écu* (Ciani 2121); to the right is a 1722 Q [Perpignan] 1/6th *écu* (Ciani 2110). These coins no doubt came from commerce between the Acadian farmers in Nova Scotia and the French on *Île Royale*. *Courtesy of Karen Burris (Ciani 2110) and Jamie Burris (Ciani 2121).*



A 1781 struck Irish counterfeit halfpenny from the St. John River Valley. Note on the obverse where the E in REX is backwards. *Courtesy Tim Allen.*



A 1783 counterfeit Irish halfpenny from the St. John River Valley. Both regal and counterfeit Irish coppers circulated widely in British North America. *Courtesy Bazil Nash.*



On the left is a Spanish half *pistareen* from the Seville mint and on the right a 1746 pillar Spanish-American one *real* from an unknown mint, both from the reign of Philip V. The pillar piece is holed since it was a very common practice to string these small coins. Both of these were from the Chignecto region. *Courtesy of Len Collette.*



A genuine 1721 George I halfpenny recovered from a St. John River Valley settlement. *Courtesy of Tim Allen.*



An obvious 1775 George III struck counterfeit halfpenny of English origin. Counterfeit English halfpence, especially those of George III postdated to 1775, were the most prevalent coppers in post-Revolutionary United States and, as expected, many were found Nova Scotia. This one is from the St. John River region. *Courtesy of Tim Allen.*



This 1787 Connecticut Miller 29.2-o was found in the company of several other Connecticut, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Jersey coppers in the St. John River Valley. These Confederation issues are dated after the 1783 Loyalist migration; these coins either came with later immigrants or in trade with the United States. Many of these once-buried coppers lacked adequate contrast and details for good photographic reproduction. *Courtesy of Bazil Nash.*



A 1786 New Jersey Maris 14-J also from the St. John River Valley. *Courtesy of Tim Allen.*



1739G [Poitiers] *double sous* or *double sols* [24 deniers] of Louis XV with “twin flowers” *différent* at bottom of reverse. Nearly one-fourth of the 174 French billon pieces recovered at Louisbourg were of this style. *Courtesy of Robert A. Vlack.*



This 1755A *double sols* is a well made contemporary counterfeit, probably from Birmingham (see Moogk, “When Money Talks,” p. 59), in imitation of a Paris mint issue. *Courtesy of Robert A. Vlack.*



A 1780 H Louis XVI sou [La Rochelle] (Ciani 2194) found in the St. John River Valley. Because it is dated after the fall of Canada in 1763, this coin would have more likely come from the United States due to the French influence during the Revolution. *Courtesy of Bazil Nash.*



Left: Ancient douzain (1596) counterstamped in 1640 raising the value from 12 to 15 deniers. *Middle:* Old planchet restruck from 1692-1705 with new dies but on which the former 1640 counterstamp is still visible. *Right:* 1692-1705 issue of 15 deniers (1693) struck on new planchet. Bourges mint. *Courtesy of Peter Moogk.*



A comparison with the “Dardenne” of 1710-12 (left) and the demi-sol of 1719-23 (center) – both worth six deniers – made it clear that the copper “colonies françoises” issue of 1721-22 (right) was over-valued at nine deniers. *Courtesy of Peter Moogk.*



A 30 deniers mousquetaire of 1709-13 minted for the overseas colonies. *Courtesy of Peter Moogk.*